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Belief Ascription

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## BELIEF ASCRIPTION\*

I shall do four things in this paper. First, I shall propose a certain theory of the semantics of belief ascriptions as being the best theory of their semantics relative to a certain assumption. Second, I shall raise three problems for this best theory. Third, I shall make what I hope is an interesting connection between the main issue addressed and the vexing question about the form that a meaning theory for a particular language must take. And, fourth, I shall close with a word about the theoretical situation thus determined.

The assumption in question is the widely accepted one that each natural language has a correct compositional truth theory. A compositional truth theory for a particular language *L* is a finitely axiomatizable theory of *L* that issues in a theorem of the form

An utterance of 'S' is true in *L* iff such and such.

for each of the infinitely many truth-evaluable sentences of *L*. For example, a truth theory for English might contain a theorem like

An utterance of 'She wrote it' is true in English iff the female referred to by the utterance of 'she' wrote the thing referred to by the utterance of 'it'.

If we assume that English has a correct compositional truth theory, then we may ask how a particular class of sentences is to be accommodated in such a theory. This is to ask about the kinds of

\* I am much indebted to the participants in the seminar I gave on these topics in 1991 at the CUNY Graduate Center. Earlier versions of this paper were read in spring 1991 at the University of Wisconsin/Madison, the University of Chicago, and the SOFIA conference in Salamanca, Spain. I benefited considerably from the discussions at these talks, and especially from the comments of Ned Block, James Higginbotham, Richard Jeffrey, Jaegwon Kim, Ernest LePore, Richard Mendelsohn, and Ernest Sosa.

semantic values that would have to be assigned to the components of those sentences and the kinds of compositional rules that would need to apply to those values in order to crank out a truth condition for each sentence of the class. Roughly speaking, this question of accommodation within a compositional truth theory is what philosophers are concerned with when they ask about the *logical form* of a class of sentences. And this is my cue to restate the first of the things I shall do—namely, to offer what I take to be the best account of the logical form of belief ascriptions. In other words, I shall try to say how belief ascriptions would have to be accommodated in a compositional truth theory on the assumption that English has one.

#### I. THE HIDDEN-INDEXICAL THEORY BALDLY STATED

If English has a compositional truth theory, how should belief sentences be accommodated in it? What, that is to ask, is the best theory of the logical form of belief ascriptions on the assumption that they have a logical form? The theory I shall propose in answer to this question is one I shall call the *hidden-indexical theory*. It is a theory whose essential idea must have occurred to almost anyone who has thought seriously about the semantics of belief sentences. I first discussed a version of it in “Naming and Knowing”;<sup>1</sup> I discuss it briefly in the form I shall presently give it in “The ‘Fido’-Fido Theory of Belief”;<sup>2</sup> and a version of the theory is nicely presented and defended in Mark Crimmins’s and John Perry’s “The Prince and the Phone Booth: Reporting Puzzling Beliefs.”<sup>3</sup>

The theory, in my favored version, begins with the claim that believing—the relation expressed by ‘believes’ in a sentence of the form ‘ $x$  believes that  $S$ ’—is a three-place relation,  $B(x, p, m)$ , holding among a believer  $x$ , a certain sort of *structured proposition*  $p$ , and a *mode of presentation*  $m$  under which  $x$  believes  $p$ . The idea is that  $x$  may believe  $p$  under one mode of presentation  $m$ , disbelieve  $p$  under a second mode of presentation  $m'$ , and suspend judgment altogether under a third mode of presentation  $m''$ . Actually, I should have said that believing is a four-place relation, where the fourth place is a time at which  $x$  believes  $p$  under  $m$ , but I shall suppress the temporal reference for simplicity. Let me now explain the notions of a structured proposition and a mode of presentation before moving on to the essence of the theory, its account of the semantics of belief reports.

The sort of proposition I have in mind is a structured entity whose basic components always include at least one property or relation,

<sup>1</sup> *Midwest Studies in Philosophy*, II (1977): 28–41.

<sup>2</sup> *Philosophical Perspectives*, I (1987): 455–80.

<sup>3</sup> This JOURNAL, LXXXVI, 12 (December 1989): 685–711.

and may include any sort of contingently existing object. The simplest example of such a structured proposition would be a so-called *singular proposition*, such as the ordered pair  $\langle \text{Fido, doghood} \rangle$ . This proposition is true just in case Fido instantiates doghood, the property of being a dog; that is to say, just in case Fido is a dog. Interesting technical questions arise about the representation of more complex propositions, but singular propositions will serve present purposes well enough. All that really matters to the hidden-indexical theory is that the propositions we believe are structured entities composed out of the objects and properties we are pretheoretically taken to be talking about when we express our beliefs. I shall call such propositions *Kaplan propositions*, in honor of David Kaplan, who did so much to popularize them.<sup>4</sup>

This brings us to modes of presentation. A mode of presentation of a *proposition* is determined by (a) the modes of presentation of the objects and properties contained in the proposition and (b) the place of those things in the proposition. As a first approximation, you might think of a mode of presentation of a proposition as an *n*-tuple of modes of presentation of the objects and properties contained in the proposition.

The expression ‘mode of presentation’, as it was introduced by Gottlob Frege and as it is used today, is a technical notion, and to understand it is to appreciate the need for its introduction. Two little stories should help remind us of that need.<sup>5</sup>

The first is the infamous case of the morning dog and the evening dog. There is a certain dog who begs at Ralph’s door every morning. Ralph feeds this dog, whom he has named ‘Fido’, and has grown attached to it. Ralph believes that Fido is male. There is also a certain dog who begs at Ralph’s door every evening. Ralph feeds this

<sup>4</sup> Let a *singular proposition* be any ordered pair  $\langle \langle x_1, \dots, x_n \rangle, \Phi_n \rangle$ , where  $\langle x_1, \dots, x_n \rangle$  is an *n*-ary sequence of items and  $\Phi^n$  is an *n*-ary property (brackets are customarily dropped for one-membered sequences). Such a proposition is true just in case its *n*-ary sequence instantiates its *n*-ary property. One way to go with Kaplan propositions is to treat them all as singular propositions. Thus, the proposition that *Fido is a dog and Pieface is a cat* might be

$\langle \langle \langle \text{Fido, doghood} \rangle, \langle \text{Pieface, cathood} \rangle \rangle, \text{CONJ} \rangle$

where CONJ is that relation between two propositions that obtains iff both are true; and the proposition that some dogs bark might to a first approximation be represented as

$\langle \text{the property of being a dog that barks, SOME} \rangle$

where SOME is that property that a property has iff it is instantiated. And so on.

<sup>5</sup> The next couple of paragraphs derive from my “The Mode-of-Presentation Problem,” in C. Anderson and J. Owens, eds., *Propositional Attitudes* (Stanford: CSLI, 1990).

dog, too, whom he has named 'Fi Fi', and has also grown quite attached to it. Ralph believes that Fi Fi is female, and he thinks that Fido and Fi Fi would make a really cute couple. Unbeknown to Ralph, Fido *is* Fi Fi.

The second story is that of the spurious natural kind shmoghood. Ralph came upon a race of creatures that he thought comprised a previously unencountered biological species, and he introduced the word 'shmog' to designate members of that species. "A thing shall be called a 'shmog'," Ralph said, "just in case it belongs to the species of these creatures." Unbeknown to him, however, shmoghood is doghood; Ralph had stumbled not upon a new species but upon a new race of dogs, and thus the property that 'shmog' has been introduced as standing for is none other than doghood.

Now, when Ralph says "Fido is male but Fi Fi is female," he is not being irrational in holding the belief which that utterance expresses. But he could not rationally hold the belief that would be expressed by an utterance of 'Fido is and is not male'. Likewise, Ralph is not irrational in holding the two beliefs expressed by a morning utterance of 'This dog is male' and an evening utterance of 'This dog is female', even though the same dog is referred to in both utterances. But Ralph could not rationally hold the belief that would be expressed by a sincere utterance of 'This dog is and isn't male'.

Similarly, when Ralph says "Fido is a dog, not a shmog," and when he says "No dogs are shmogs," he is not being irrational in holding the beliefs those utterances express. But he would be irrational were he to hold the belief that would be expressed by an utterance of 'No dogs are dogs'.

Appeal to the notion of a mode of presentation is designed precisely to accommodate these sorts of data. The intuitive idea, definitive of the notion of a mode of presentation, may be called *Frege's constraint*. Stated informally and in a way that prescind from the details of any particular theorist's account of belief or of belief-ascribing sentences, Frege's constraint has two parts. First it says that a rational person  $x$  may both believe and disbelieve that a certain thing or property  $y$  is such and such only if there are distinct modes of presentation  $m$  and  $m'$  such that  $x$  believes  $y$  to be such and such under  $m$  and disbelieves it to be such and such under  $m'$ . Then it says that there are distinct modes of presentation  $m$  and  $m'$  such that rational person  $x$  believes  $y$  to be such and such under  $m$  and disbelieves  $y$  to be such and such under  $m'$  only if  $x$  fails to realize that  $m$  and  $m'$  are modes of presentation of one and the same thing. In other words, you cannot rationally believe and disbelieve something under one and the same mode of presentation, or under

modes of presentation that you realize are modes of presentation of the same thing. The notion of a mode of presentation is *functionally defined* by Frege's constraint in that something is a mode of presentation if it plays the role defined by Frege's constraint, and nothing can be a mode of presentation unless it plays that role. *To ask what modes of presentation are is just to ask what things play that role.* Presently I shall raise the question of what modes of presentation might be, but the hidden-indexical theory I shall now describe is so far neutral on the outcome of that question.

As applied to the paradigmatic example

[1] Ralph believes that Fido is a dog.

the hidden-indexical theory says that the logical form of an utterance of this sentence may be represented as

[2]  $(\exists m) (\Phi^*m \ \& \ B(\text{Ralph}, \langle \text{Fido}, \text{doghood} \rangle, m))$

where  $\Phi^*$  is an implicitly referred to and contextually determined type of mode of presentation. By a type of mode of presentation I mean merely a property of modes of presentation;  $\Phi^*$ , for example, might be that property that a propositional mode of presentation has when and only when it requires thinking of Fido as being the dog who appears in the morning and requires thinking of doghood as a property shared by such-and-such similar-looking creatures. The reference to a type of mode of presentation is implicit in that, although the sentence requires the speaker to be referring to a type of mode of presentation whenever the sentence is uttered, there is no word in [1] which refers to that type (whence the 'hidden' in 'hidden-indexical theory'). The reference to the type of mode of presentation is "contextually determined" in that different types may be referred to on different occasions of utterance (whence the 'indexical' in 'hidden-indexical theory').

As we shall see when I stop baldly stating the theory and begin defending it, the reference is to a type of mode of presentation rather than to some particular mode of presentation because we need not be in a position to refer to an actual mode of presentation under which someone believes a proposition. But in a limiting case reference may be to an actual mode of presentation, for the "type" referred to may be one that uniquely picks out a particular mode of presentation, or it may simply be the property of being identical to such-and-such mode of presentation. So at one end of the spectrum, the type referred to may constitute a reference to a unique mode of presentation; at the other end, the type might be vacuous, as when

the speaker's import in uttering [1] is merely that Ralph believes the proposition that Fido is a dog under some mode of presentation or other. In between, we have reference to substantial types that do not determine unique modes of presentation.

So the representation of [1] as [2] tells us quite a bit. It tells us that a correct compositional truth theory for English must construe 'believes' as a three-place relational predicate holding among believers, Kaplan propositions, and modes of presentation of those propositions. It tells us that [1]'s 'that'-clause, 'that Fido is a dog', is a referential singular term whose referent is the singular proposition  $\langle \text{Fido, doghood} \rangle$ , and it tells us that the references of 'Fido' and 'dog' in that 'that'-clause are Fido and doghood, respectively. It tells us that an utterance of the sentence requires reference to a type of mode of presentation, so that an utterance of [1] is true just in case [2], where  $\Phi^*$  is the mode-of-presentation type referred to in the utterance. And it tells us that this contextually determined reference to a type of mode of presentation is by a "hidden indexical" in that there is no actual indexical in [1] which carries this reference. In this respect, belief ascriptions are like other sentences containing hidden indexicals. For example, in uttering 'It's raining', the speaker must be referring to some place at which it is raining (typically, this is the speaker's location, but it need not be: a speaker in Chicago may reply 'It's raining' when asked about the weather in New York).

## II. REMARKS IN SUPPORT OF THE HIDDEN-INDEXICAL THEORY

According to the hidden-indexical theory, an utterance of the sentence 'A believes that *S*' is true just in case the utterer is referring to a type of mode of presentation  $\Phi$  and the referent of 'A' believes the Kaplan proposition referred to by 'that *S*' under some mode of presentation of the type  $\Phi$ . My claim is that this theory provides the best account of how belief ascriptions must be accommodated in a compositional truth theory for English if English has one. A full-scale defense of this claim would outrun a feasible number of pages, but I would like to give *some* sense of what supports the theory.

One very important thing the hidden-indexical theory tells us is that the 'that'-clause in a paradigmatic belief ascription such as [1] is a *referential singular term*. This at least has the *appearance* of being right: [1] does indeed seem to be telling us one of the things Ralph believes—to wit, that Fido is a dog. On the face of it, [1] says that Ralph stands in the belief relation to the referent of the singular term 'that Fido is a dog'. This appearance that [1]'s 'that'-clause, 'that Fido is a dog', is a referential singular term is sustained by the evident validity of arguments such as

Ralph believes that Fido is a dog, and so does Thelma.  
So, there is something that they both believe (viz., that Fido is a dog).

Ralph believes everything that Thelma says.  
Thelma says that Fido is a dog.  
So, Ralph believes that Fido is a dog.

Ralph believes that Fido is a dog.  
That Fido is a dog is impossible.  
So, Ralph believes something that is impossible (viz., that Fido is a dog).

For how else are we to account for the validity of these inferences other than on the assumption that 'that'-clauses are referential singular terms? I think that the rhetorical force of this question is correct: the best explanation of the way in which these arguments may be valid does presuppose that 'that'-clauses are referential singular terms.<sup>6</sup>

It is obvious that we may give simple and straightforward explanations of the validity in question via hypotheses that entail that 'that'-clauses are referential singular terms. The question is whether validity can be accounted for without that assumption. Perhaps, as I myself argued in *Remnants of Meaning*,<sup>7</sup> the arguments are valid only when their quantifications are read *nonobjectually*, say, as something akin to substitutional quantification. This would entail that 'that'-clauses were *not* referential singular terms. Or perhaps, as Graeme Forbes<sup>8</sup> has argued, we can use some very fancy footwork to account for the validity even though [1]'s 'that'-clause disappears on analysis, leaving us with an existential generalization along the lines of

( $\exists m$ ) ( $\exists m'$ ) ( $m$  is a mode of presentation of Fido &  $m'$  is a mode of presentation of doghood & B(Ralph, the proposition that  $m$  has  $m'$ ))

Or perhaps we could salvage enough validity using Donald Davidson's "paratactic" theory of propositional-attitude ascriptions,

<sup>6</sup> I say 'the way in which these arguments *may* be valid' because of the alleged hidden-indexical nature of belief ascriptions: qua inference *type*,

Ralph believes that Fido is a dog.  
So, Ralph believes that Fido is a dog.  
is no more valid than

It's raining.  
So, it's raining.

Tokens of these inference types are valid only when premise and conclusion make the same implicit reference.

<sup>7</sup> Cambridge: MIT, 1987.

<sup>8</sup> "The Indispensability of Sinn," *The Philosophical Review*, xcix, 4 (1990): 535-63.

wherein the only singular term referring to what Ralph believes is the demonstrative 'that', as it occurs in

Ralph believes that. Fido is a dog.

when its reference is the utterance that follows it of 'Fido is a dog'.

Perhaps; but I doubt it. I have argued elsewhere<sup>9</sup> against Davidson's proposal, and if it were not for present constraints I would offer to explain why neither Forbes's line nor my former self's non-objectual-quantification line can be made to succeed.<sup>10</sup> But there are the constraints; so I must ask you provisionally to assume that I have justified the assumption that 'that'-clauses are referential singular terms. Then we may move to the question this assumption invites.

If 'that Fido is a dog' is a referential singular term, then we may ask what its reference is. To what, that is, does it refer? This, however, is easy to answer: 'that Fido is a dog' refers to that Fido is a dog; what 'that Fido is a dog' refers to is that Fido is a dog. But what is this thing, *that Fido is a dog*, which is the referent of the 'that'-clause singular term? Well: (i) it is *abstract*, in that it has no spatial location. That Fido is a dog is not under the kitchen sink or anywhere else. (ii) It is *mind- and language-independent* in that it exists in possible worlds in which there are neither thinkers nor speakers. That Fido is a dog is also language-independent in that, while it may be the content of a sentence of any language, it itself belongs to no language; it is not a linguistic entity. (iii) It has a *truth condition*, and it has its truth condition *essentially*, in contrast to the contingent way sentences have theirs. It is a contingent fact that 'Fido is a dog' is true iff Fido is a dog; if the conventions of English had been different, it might have had a totally different truth condition or none at all. But it is a necessary truth that that Fido is a dog is true iff Fido is a dog. It follows, then, that the referents of 'that'-clauses

<sup>9</sup> *Remnants of Meaning*, ch. 5.

<sup>10</sup> Well, I guess I can afford to mention one especially devastating problem for the Forbes line. Applied to

Ralph *said* that Fido is a dog.

it yields

$(\exists m) (\exists m') (m \text{ is a mode of presentation of Fido} \ \& \ m' \text{ is a mode of presentation of doghood} \ \& \ S(\text{Ralph, the proposition that } m \text{ has } m'))$

The trouble with this is that it is extremely unlikely that Ralph, in his utterance of 'Fido is a dog', will have said any such mode-of-presentation-containing proposition. If he did mean some such proposition, then there would be a specification of what he said that is other than 'that Fido is a dog' and that refers to a mode-of-presentation-containing proposition. But it is clear that there need be no such alternative specification of what he said.

are *propositions*, in the philosophical sense of that term: abstract, mind- and language-independent objects that have essentially the truth conditions they have.

If the hypothesis that 'that'-clauses are referential singular terms is to cohere with the assumption that English has a compositional truth theory, then we must suppose that each 'that'-clause is a semantically complex singular term whose reference is determined by its syntax and the references, or extensions, of its component words. What, we might then ask, are the references of 'Fido' and 'dog' in 'that Fido is a dog', as it occurs in an utterance of [1]?

For all intents and purposes, there are but two possible answers. One, apparently Frege's, is that the terms in a 'that'-clause refer to modes of presentation and the proposition referred to by the entire 'that'-clause is a structured proposition made up of those modes of presentation. With respect to a particular utterance of [1], the Fregean proposal would be that the token of 'Fido' refers to a particular mode of presentation of Fido while the token of 'dog' refers to a particular mode of presentation of doghood, the utterance of [1] thus enjoying the representation

B(Ralph,  $\langle m_f, m_d \rangle$ )

$\langle m_f, m_d \rangle$  being the mode-of-presentation-containing proposition referred to by the occurrence of 'that Fido is a dog' in the utterance. This will be true, of course, only if  $m_f$  and  $m_d$  are ways Ralph has of thinking of Fido and doghood, respectively.

The merit of this proposal is that it allows us to see how the ancient astronomer was able to believe that Hesperus was Hesperus long before she believed that Hesperus was Phosphorus. Its demerit is that it is false. For consider

[3] Everyone who has ever known her has believed that Madonna was musical.

According to the Fregean proposal, there is a particular mode of presentation  $m$  of Madonna and a particular mode of presentation  $m'$  of the property of being musical such that the foregoing utterance of [3] is true only if everyone who has ever known Madonna has believed the proposition  $\langle m, m' \rangle$ . Yet this is surely too strong a requirement on the truth of [3]. It requires that everyone who has ever known Madonna shared a single way of thinking of her and a single way of thinking of the property of being musical, and this is most unlikely given that there may have been people who knew her as a child and then died and that someone like Helen Keller may have been among them. If the Fregean proposal were correct, we

could prove that [3] was false just on the basis of the virtual certainty that, whatever modes of presentation turn out to be, there will not be one single mode of presentation of Madonna shared by all who ever knew her. But it seems that we cannot disprove [3] in this way, and this because we would count it as true if each person who has ever known Madonna thought of her as being musical *under some mode of presentation or other*.<sup>11</sup>

Our question is: What are the references of 'Fido' and 'dog' in [1]'s 'that'-clause on the assumption that it refers to a proposition that is true just in case Fido is a dog? The second possible answer is that they are Fido and doghood, respectively, ⟨Fido, doghood⟩ being the referent of 'that Fido is a dog'.<sup>12</sup> Certainly this offers a proposition with the right truth conditions. The *prima facie* problem with this proposal is that it is apt to suggest—and has been taken by many to suggest—that the logical form of [1] may be represented as

[4] B(Ralph, ⟨Fido, doghood⟩)

And you may be very quickly reminded of the well-known problem with this representation if I momentarily change the example. Surely, Lois Lane does not believe that Clark Kent flies, though she does believe that Superman flies. But this is impossible according to

<sup>11</sup> Here is a longer way of showing that 'that'-clauses do not refer to mode-of-presentation-containing propositions. Intuitively, 'believes that Fido is a dog' may be univocally true of people who think of Fido and doghood in radically different ways (you and Helen Keller may be among them) and who do not share any single mode of presentation for either Fido or doghood. This shows that 'that Fido is a dog' makes no context-independent reference to a mode-of-presentation-containing proposition. At the same time, a speaker may truly say that so-and-so believes that Fido is a dog even though she is not in a position to refer to any particular mode of presentation so-and-so has for either Fido or doghood. This shows that the 'that'-clause makes no context-dependent reference to a mode-of-presentation-containing proposition. And if it makes neither a context-independent nor a context-dependent reference to such a proposition, then it makes no reference to one.

<sup>12</sup> Friends of possible-worlds semantics or of counterpart theory will think my rush to singular propositions a bit cavalier. Why not say that the reference of 'Fido' is a function from possible worlds to referents of 'Fido' in those worlds—Fido himself, perhaps, in each world, or variable counterparts of our Fido? First, I think importation of possible worlds is unmotivated, though I cannot argue that here. Second, I think any *prima facie* plausible theory that used possible worlds and propositions that were constructions based on them would, when the dust settled, simply yield alternative styles of bookkeeping. Third, nothing that I really care about changes if, say, you opt for a version of the hidden-indexical theory wherein 'Fido' in a 'that'-clause refers to that constant function that maps each possible world onto our Fido (but the counterpart theory might be a version of the rejected proposal that the referent is a mode of presentation of Fido).

the present proposal, since, as Clark Kent = Superman, the proposition that Superman flies = the proposition that Clark Kent flies. Likewise, reverting now to the ongoing example, Ralph may believe that Fido is a dog without believing that Fido is a shmog, and he may believe that Fido is male without believing that Fi Fi is male. Yet all this is impossible according to the theory in question, since it implies that the proposition that Fido is a dog = the proposition that Fido is a shmog and that the proposition that Fido is male = the proposition that Fi Fi is male. The problem is even manifested in belief ascriptions involving indexical reference. For example, pointing to one mug shot, Thelma might say, 'I believe that he is the culprit', while pointing to another, she might say, 'I neither believe nor disbelieve that this guy is the culprit; I simply can't tell'. Intuitively, both of her utterances are true, even though, as it may happen, the same man is referred to in each utterance; but this, again, is incompatible with the proposal in question.

Nathan Salmon<sup>13</sup> has tried to defend the extreme 'Fido'-Fido theory of belief that would represent [1] as [4] by trying to explain away the patina of counterintuitiveness adhering to the theory's consequences. But I think he has not succeeded, and in "The 'Fido'-Fido Theory of Belief" I try to show why.<sup>14</sup> We really do need a theory that allows us to see how an utterance of

Lois believes that Superman flies but doesn't believe that Clark Kent flies.

can be literally true.

Here, then, is our situation. We are motivated to see [1]'s 'that'-clause as a referential singular term whose reference is the proposition that Fido is a dog. Since we are assuming that English has a compositional truth theory, we must hold the reference of this 'that'-clause to be determined by its syntax and the semantic values the words in the 'that'-clause have in it. Those semantic values—those references—cannot be modes of presentation, and the only viable option is that they are Fido, for 'Fido', and doghood, for 'dog'. At the same time, we cannot accept the representation of [1] as [4], for we also want to allow that Ralph does not believe that Fido is a shmog.

Enter now on its white charger the hidden-indexical theory, which satisfies all desiderata. This theory, you will recall, represents the

<sup>13</sup> *Frege's Puzzle* (Cambridge: MIT, 1986).

<sup>14</sup> See also Salmon's reply, "Illogical Belief," *Philosophical Perspectives*, III (1989): 243–85.

logical form of an utterance of [1] as [2], where  $\Phi^*$  is an implicitly referred to and contextually determined type of mode of presentation. Thus, 'that Fido is a dog' in [1] is a referential singular term whose referent is the singular proposition  $\langle \text{Fido, doghood} \rangle$ , and thus the referents of 'Fido' and 'dog' in that 'that'-clause are Fido and doghood, respectively. At the same time, we can see how an utterance of

[5] Ralph does not believe that Fido is a shmog.

can also be true, even though, as shmoghood = doghood, 'shmog' in [5] has the same reference as 'dog' in [1], so that the 'that'-clause in each sentence refers to one and the same singular proposition, to wit,  $\langle \text{Fido, doghood (i.e., shmoghood)} \rangle$ . That the utterances of [1] and [5] can both be true is due, of course, to the hidden-indexical feature: in the normal case, the type of mode of presentation referred to in an utterance of [1] will be different from that referred to in an utterance of [5]. Likewise in the other examples discussed, and likewise as regards the London/Londres and Paderewski examples that puzzled Saul Kripke.<sup>15</sup> These are no puzzles for the hidden-indexical theory.

### III. THREE PROBLEMS FOR THE HIDDEN-INDEXICAL THEORY

So much for what recommends the hidden-indexical theory. I shall now raise three problems for the theory.

The candidate problem. This problem arises for *any* theory that appeals to modes of presentation. It is a problem I have discussed at length elsewhere,<sup>16</sup> and I will say only enough about it now to indicate its nature. In a nutshell, the candidate problem is that there is some question whether there is a plausible candidate for what modes of presentation are.

The notion of a mode of presentation is, we saw, a functionally defined technical notion: a mode of presentation is whatever plays the mode-of-presentation role defined by Frege's constraint. So we may ask what things play that role. This is like asking what genes are, the notion of a gene being functionally defined as whatever is responsible for the transmission of hereditary characteristics. There the answer turned out to be segments of DNA molecules. What, though, is the answer to the mode-of-presentation question? There is no dearth of proposed answers:

<sup>15</sup> "A Puzzle about Belief," in A. Margalit, ed., *Meaning and Use* (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1979).

<sup>16</sup> "The Basis of Reference," *Erkenntnis*, XIII, 1 (1978): 171–206; *Remnants of Meaning*, esp. ch. 3; and "The Mode-of-Presentation Problem."

Modes of presentation are *individual concepts*, uniqueness properties of the form *the property of being the unique instantiator of such-and-such property*.

Modes of presentation are simply *general properties* that make no pretense of applying uniquely to the things of which they are modes of presentation.

Modes of presentation are *percept tokens*, actual instances of sensory experience.

Modes of presentation are “*stereotypes*,” perhaps what cognitive psychologists call *prototypes*.

Modes of presentation are “*characters*,” functions from contexts of the utterance of an expression to the expression’s contents in those contexts.

Modes of presentation are *public language expressions*.

Modes of presentation are *Mentalese expressions*, formulae in the neural language of thought.

Modes of presentation are *functional roles*, perhaps conceptual roles of Mentalese expressions.

Modes of presentation are *causal chains* linking Mentalese names and predicates to the objects and properties for which they stand.

And finally there is the *no-theory theory of modes of presentation*, which rejects what I have elsewhere called the *intrinsic-description constraint*.<sup>17</sup>

This constraint holds that if a thing is a mode of presentation—if, that is, it plays the mode-of-presentation role—then it must be intrinsically identifiable in a way that does not describe it as a mode of presentation or as a possible mode of presentation. If a thing is a mode of presentation, then it must be intrinsically identifiable as some other kind of thing. Rejecting this constraint, the no-theory theorist of modes of presentation holds that modes of presentation are modes of presentation and there is an end to it. You simply cannot say what they are in any other terms.

But I think the intrinsic-description constraint *is* well-motivated, and I think there are compelling objections against each of the foregoing candidates but one. The exception is the view that modes of presentation are functional roles, perhaps conceptual roles of Mentalese expressions. This view of what modes of presentation are has intrinsic problems and it does not cohere with every theory of the logical form of belief ascription; but its problems do not *refute* it and it does cohere with the hidden-indexical theory.<sup>18</sup> In any case, the

<sup>17</sup> “The Mode-of-Presentation Problem.”

<sup>18</sup> This corrects a flawed argument in “The Mode-of-Presentation Problem” which was intended to show that modes of presentation cannot be conceptual roles of Mentalese expressions. The argument overlooked what must be the in-

hidden-indexical theory entails that believing is a relation among a believer, a proposition, and a mode of presentation of that proposition, which mode of presentation is in turn determined by modes of presentation of the proposition's components. It is hard to see how we can reasonably accept this theory without some well-motivated idea of what these modes of presentation are supposed to be.

The meaning-intention problem. This problem is that one may reasonably doubt that belief ascribers mean what the hidden-indexical theory requires them to mean when they ascribe beliefs. Let me explain.

Floyd's sister calls him in Chicago and asks about the weather. Floyd replies, "It's raining." Here Floyd refers to Chicago, and this by virtue of the fact that in uttering 'It's raining', Floyd *means* that it is raining in Chicago. In other words, Floyd counts as having referred to Chicago because the proposition he meant is about Chicago. Notice that there is no difficulty whatever in ascribing to Floyd the propositional speech act in question: he clearly intended his sister to believe that it was raining *in Chicago*, and he is quite prepared to tell you that this is what he meant, what he implicitly said, and what he intended her to be informed of. Because these things are so clear, Floyd's utterance is a paradigm of implicit reference.

Now for a different case. During a casual conversation about airfare bargains, Flora says,

[6] Harold believes that TWA is offering a New York-Paris return fare for \$318.

According to the hidden-indexical theory, there is a property  $\Phi$  of modes of presentation of the proposition that TWA is offering a New York-Paris return fare for \$318 such that Flora referred to  $\Phi$  in her utterance. If this is true, then, presumably, it is because Flora, in producing her utterance, meant some proposition about  $\Phi$  in just

tended generalization of the hidden-indexical theory for belief ascriptions with embedded 'that'-clauses—namely, that a belief ascription with  $n$  'that'-clauses embedded in the primary 'that'-clause must be making  $n + 1$  implicit references to types of modes of presentation. Thus, the logical form of an utterance of

Floyd believes that Lois believes that Superman flies.

is

$(\exists m) (\Phi m \ \& \ B(\text{Floyd}, [(\exists m') (\Phi' m' \ \& \ B(\text{Lois}, [\text{Superman flies}], m'))], m))$

where  $\Phi$  and  $\Phi'$  are implicitly referred to and contextually determined types of modes of presentation (and where '[. . .]' is a singular-term forming operator with the force of 'the proposition that . . .'). If this inevitable complexity weakens the plausibility of the hidden-indexical theory, then so be it.

the way that Floyd, in his utterance, meant some proposition about Chicago. But, we shall see, it is doubtful that Flora meant any such thing.

We had no trouble saying what Floyd meant in uttering 'It's raining': he meant that it was raining in Chicago. But what that implies a reference to a type of mode of presentation does Flora mean in uttering [6]? It must surely be

[7] that there is something that both has  $\Phi$  and is such that Harold believes the proposition *that TWA is offering a New York-Paris return fare for \$318* under it

for some particular property  $\Phi$  of modes of presentation of the proposition that TWA is offering a New York-Paris return fare for \$318. But—and this is where the trouble begins—neither Flora nor her audience is aware of her meaning any such thing. Floyd is consciously aware of both the *form* of the proposition he meant (he is aware that he meant that it is raining *in* Chicago) and the implicitly referred to thing the proposition is about (he is aware that he meant that it is raining in *Chicago*). But it is doubtful that the non-philosopher Flora has conscious access to the form of [7], and it is especially doubtful that she has conscious awareness of referring to any mode-of-presentation property. That is to say, if she did mean a proposition of form [7], then she has no conscious awareness of what property  $\Phi$  that proposition is about, and no conscious awareness, therefore, of what she meant in uttering [6].

Neither we nor Flora can say what mode-of-presentation property was referred to in her utterance of [6]. Just try to say it. The referred-to property, if it exists, would be given by a completion of the form

The property of being an *m* such that to believe the proposition *that TWA is offering a New York-Paris return fare for \$318* under *m* requires thinking of TWA, the offering relation, New York, Paris, the US dollar currency, the number 318 [and so on for the other components of the proposition] in . . . ways, respectively.

But the nonphilosopher Flora has no access even to this *form* of specification, and who among us can offer to replace the three dots? Now, of course, it is in principle possible to have knowledge of such a property even though one cannot specify it in the forgoing way. One might, for example, have knowledge of it under some quite extrinsic description. But I submit that it will be obvious on reflection that Flora has no such alternative way of explicitly picking out a property of modes of presentation to which she is implicitly refer-

ring in her utterance of [6].<sup>19</sup> There is no sentence  $\sigma$  such that Flora can say 'I meant that  $\sigma$ ', where 'that  $\sigma$ ' explicitly refers to a proposition of [7]'s form.

Thus, if the hidden-indexical theory is correct, then Flora has no conscious awareness of what she means, or of what she is saying, in uttering [6], and this is a *prima facie* reason to deny that she means what the theory is committed to saying she means.

There is more than one way a hidden-indexical theorist might respond to this *prima facie* problem, but let me go directly to what I think is the theorist's best bet. This response is to concede that Flora is not *aware* of meaning a proposition of form [7] under any mode of presentation, but to insist that she nevertheless meant such a proposition. The idea is to appeal to so-called "tacit belief" and "tacit intention." This idea has its origin, I believe, in Noam Chomsky's controversial claim that speakers know a grammar of their language. To this it was protested that in no ordinary sense of 'know' do speakers know any such thing. When the dust settled, many theorists supposed that the best construal of Chomsky's claim was that the correct theory of language processing implies that a speaker has an internal representation of the grammar of her language, where this internal representation is stored not as a *belief*, but as what Stephen Stich was later to call a *subdoxastic state*.<sup>20</sup> Subdoxastic states are representational states that are belief-like in some respects but differ from paradigmatic beliefs in their unavailability to consciousness and the way they are inferentially isolated from beliefs (for example, if you believe that if  $p$ , then  $q$ , and believe  $p$ , you are likely to infer  $q$ ; but you will not make this inference if the state representing  $p$  is subdoxastic). Now, the notion of a tacit propositional attitude can admit of a spectrum of cases, from the Chomsky-required subdoxastic states at one end, to states that may reasonably be claimed to be subsumable under our current propositional-attitude concepts, at the other. What is evidently unifying about the notion of a tacit propositional attitude is that a tacit propositional attitude is unavailable to consciousness and that one cannot be made irrational by conflicts between those of one's

<sup>19</sup> Besides, it is quite against the spirit of the hidden-indexical theory that the type of mode of presentation referred to should be one that the speaker knows only under some nonintrinsic mode of presentation. The idea of the theory is that, though one might not know the particular mode of presentation under which so-and-so believes that such-and-such, still one has access to some interesting *description* that the mode of presentation satisfies.

<sup>20</sup> "Beliefs and Subdoxastic States," *Philosophy of Science*, XLV (1978): 499–518.

thoughts which are available to consciousness and those which are merely tacit. At any rate, the present proposal is that it is thanks to her *tacit* beliefs and intentions in uttering [6] that Flora means a proposition of [7]'s form even though she is not aware of meaning any such thing.

One trouble with the tacit-intention proposal is that it induces a rather radical *error theory*: not only do ordinary belief ascribers have no conscious knowledge of what they are asserting, they also turn out not to have the conscious thoughts they think they have. Flora clearly *thinks* she has conscious knowledge of what she is asserting in uttering [6]. She is quite prepared to say, "Look, what I am saying, and all that I am saying, is that Harold believes that TWA is offering a New York-Paris return fare for \$318." In other words, she thinks she is consciously aware of what she is asserting in uttering [6], but the tacit-intention line implies that here she is in error: the only proposition she asserts in uttering [6]—viz., some proposition of form [7]—is not anything of which she is conscious. What makes this error aspect of the tacit-intention proposal problematic is not merely that it riddles the propositional-attitude ascriptions of ordinary speakers with error; it also forces us to qualify our views about first-person authority in an important way. Flora does not have the privileged access to what she consciously means, intends, and believes in uttering [6] which one might reasonably have supposed to be part of a normal person's functional architecture.

A more serious trouble with the tacit-intention proposal actually constitutes a direct objection to the claim that speakers have the meaning intentions the hidden-indexical theory requires them to have, whether or not those intentions are claimed to be tacit. But the objection is best presented here, in response to the tacit-intention proposal, since it is obvious that speakers do not consciously mean what the hidden-indexical theory entails that they mean. The objection takes hold even if it is conceded that ordinary people do have some sort of indirect awareness of modes of presentation, which is all to the good, as it is not out of the question that one could motivate the idea that Flora tacitly *believes* that Harold believes the proposition about TWA under a certain type of mode of presentation. The point to be pressed, however, is that considerably more is required of tacit *meaning*. I shall explain.

Meaning entails audience-directed intentions, and one cannot mean something without intending to be understood. Part of meaning that such and such is intending one's audience to recognize that that is what one meant, and—a corollary—part of referring to a thing is intending one's audience to recognize that reference. Con-

sequently, the present tacit-intention proposal requires there to be some type of mode of presentation  $\Phi$  such that Flora tacitly means that Harold believes that TWA . . . under a mode of presentation of type  $\Phi$ , and tacitly intends her audience to recognize (no doubt tacitly) that she means that Harold believes that TWA . . . under a mode of presentation of type  $\Phi$ . But as James Higginbotham pointed out to me, this puts the implausibility of Flora's *meaning* a proposition of form [7] on a par with that of a certain way of trying to extend the description theory to "incomplete" definite descriptions. The idea there is that, when a speaker utters a sentence like 'The dog has fleas', then there must be some property  $\Phi$  such that she means the proposition that the thing that is uniquely a dog and  $\Phi$  has fleas. What makes this so implausible is that there will typically be a number of potentially completing descriptions that are equally salient in the context (e.g., *the dog that I own*, *the dog we are both looking at*, *the spotted dog in the green chair*, and so on). Consequently, it is highly implausible that there will be *one* such description such that the speaker intends it to be understood between her and her audience that she means a proposition containing that very description.<sup>21</sup>

Now, just the same problem arises with the meaning claim required by the hidden-indexical theory. For assume that propositions are believed under modes of presentation. If a proposition is believed under one mode of presentation, then it will typically be believed under many modes of presentation. Further, each of those modes of presentation will instantiate infinitely many *types* of modes of presentation, many of which will be equally salient in the communicative context. This makes it extremely implausible that of all the equally salient types of ways that Harold has of believing the proposition about TWA, Flora should mean—and intend to be taken to mean—a proposition about one definite one of them.

A little thought experiment should make the objection vivid. When considering the hypothesis that a certain expression has a certain semantic property, it is often helpful to introduce an expression that has that semantic property by stipulation. Presently in debate is the hidden-indexical theory's claim that one uttering [6] would mean a proposition of the form [7] displays. So let us introduce 'shmelieves' as a term that satisfies the hidden-indexical theory by stipulation: to utter a sentence of the form

<sup>21</sup> See my "Indexicals and the Theory of Reference," *Synthese*, XLIX, 1 (1981):43–100; esp. pp. 77–8.

A shmelieves that *S*.

with its literal meaning requires a speaker to mean

that there is something that both has  $\Phi$  and is such that *A* believes the proposition that *S* under it

for some particular contextually determinate property  $\Phi$  of modes of presentation of the proposition that *S*. The hidden-indexical theory may or may not be true of '*A believes that S*', but it is true by stipulation of '*A shmelieves that S*'.

So far so good, but let me now try to use this newly minted coin to make an assertion.

Placido Domingo shmelieves that Luciano Pavarotti will be arriving at Orly airport today at around 4 PM Paris time.

Very well, what assertion did I make? What is the type of mode of presentation  $\Phi$  such that I meant that Placido Domingo believes the proposition *that Luciano Pavarotti will be arriving at Orly airport today at around 4 PM Paris time* under a mode of presentation that has  $\Phi$ ? Remember,  $\Phi$  is made up of types of modes of presentation for each of the constituents of the proposition to which my 'that'-clause refers: Luciano Pavarotti, the arrival relation, Orly airport, the number 4, Paris, etc. The question, of course, cannot be answered. For although 'shmelieves' was stipulatively given a perfectly good hidden-indexical semantics, I was not, in uttering the displayed sentence, in a position assertively to use it, and this because I was not in a position to refer to a contextually determinate type of mode of presentation. None is sufficiently salient to enable you, my audience, to identify it as the one I meant, and this notwithstanding the fact that we understand all the concepts involved and everything has been painstakingly raised for us to the level of conscious awareness.

The application to the hidden-indexical theory should be clear. Although I cannot utter the forgoing 'shmelieves' sentence and mean what its literal meaning requires me to mean, there are no such impediments to my uttering 'Placido Domingo *believes* that Luciano Pavarotti will be arriving at Orly airport today at around 4 PM Paris time'. I can perfectly well utter this and hope to have my literal assertion be perfectly well-understood by you. Since 'shmelieves' is by stipulation what 'believes' would be if the hidden-indexical theory were true, this appears to show that the theory is not true. The best account of why neither Flora nor her audience (who understood her perfectly well) is aware of her meaning a proposition of form [7], as the hidden-indexical theory requires her to

mean, is not that the requisite meaning intentions have gone tacit; it is that she does not mean any such thing.

The logical-form problem. According to the hidden-indexical theory, 'believes' is a three-place relational predicate. But this might strike one as fishy for the following reason. If 'believes' really were three-place, then it ought to have occurrences where its three-place form is explicit, as the three-placedness of 'gives' is made explicit when we move from 'She gave the house' to 'She gave the house to her husband'. Yet in what analogous way can we make explicit the three-placedness of 'Ralph believes that Fido is a dog'? Perhaps in the way of

[8] Ralph believes that Fido is a dog *in way w/under mode of presentation m.*

There are, however, two problems with this.

First, this is no ordinary-language specification but technical jargon. If one is told that Mary gave the house, one can ask, "To whom did she give the house?" But what is the corresponding ordinary-language question for 'Ralph believes that Fido is a dog'? Ask a nonphilosopher, "In what way, or under what mode of presentation, does Ralph believe this?" and your best answer will be a puzzled look.

Second, [8] does not look like a specification of a three-place relation. It looks more like a two-place relation with *an adverbial qualifier*. In other words, it is to be assimilated to

Ralph kissed her in the most exciting way.

where 'the most exciting way' is merely part of an adverb, rather than to

[9] Mary gave the house to her husband.

where 'her husband' is an argument of the verb 'to give'. Evidence for this assimilation comes from well-known constraints in syntactic theory which distinguish between arguments and adverbs in their ability to extract from 'whether'-clauses.<sup>22</sup> Thus, the argument status of 'her husband' in [9] is revealed in the fact that we can answer 'Her husband' in response to the question

To whom did you wonder whether Mary gave the house?

<sup>22</sup> See Chomsky, *Barriers* (Cambridge: MIT, 1986). I owe this reference and the point about 'whether'-clauses to Robert Fiengo.

And the nonargument, adverbial status of 'way *w*/mode of presentation *m*' in [8] is revealed by the fact that it *cannot* be given in answer to the question

In what way/under what mode of presentation did you wonder whether Ralph believes that Fido is a dog?

#### IV. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE ISSUE

I have proposed that, if natural languages have compositional truth theories, then the hidden-indexical theory is the correct account of the accommodation of belief ascriptions in them. I have also offered some reason for thinking the hidden-indexical theory is false. If it is both conditionally correct and false, then it follows that natural languages do not have compositional truth theories. This is one reason the issue of the semantics of belief ascriptions is important. There is, however, another reason for the importance of the question of the accommodation of belief ascriptions in a compositional truth theory; it has to do with the bearing of this question on the vexing question about the form that a compositional *meaning* theory for a language must take. I shall explain.

It is commonly assumed that each natural language *L* has a *compositional meaning theory*, this being a finitely axiomatizable theory of *L* whose theorems ascribe to each sentence of *L* its meaning in *L*. Those who make the assumption reason that without it there will be no explaining either the platitude that the meaning of a sentence is determined by its syntax and the meanings of its component words or the fact that we have the ability to understand indefinitely many novel sentences. But while it is generally agreed that every natural language enjoys a compositional meaning theory, no three philosophers can be made to agree on the form such a theory must take. For a start, it is not even clear what form the *theorems* of a meaning theory would have to take. You might at first blush suppose that a compositional meaning theory for *L* would generate theorems of the form

'S' means in *L* that such and such.

but this could hardly be the form of a theorem for sentences like 'He was there' or 'Stop singing, you idiot!' and it is anything but clear that the word 'means' should ever be used in saying what a sentence means. After all, to know the meaning of a sentence is to be able to know what a speaker is saying in uttering the sentence; so it is reasonable to suppose that a compositional meaning theory would have to ascribe to each sentence a feature, knowledge of which would enable us to know what would be said in the utterance

of any sentence having that feature. But there is no agreement as to what such a feature would be like, or that the word 'meaning' would need to be used to ascribe it.

Those who assume that each natural language has a compositional *meaning* theory typically assume that each natural language also has a compositional *truth* theory, in the sense already glossed. After all, it is part of the *meaning* of 'Snow is white' that an utterance of it is true iff snow is white; so if it is reasonable to think a compositional theory can assign meanings to sentences, then it is reasonable to think one can assign truth conditions to them, too. What we are now in a position to see is that, if we know how to accommodate belief ascriptions in a compositional truth theory, then we will be able to answer the question about the form that a compositional meaning theory must take. This ought at first to seem a little surprising. Merely knowing how to accommodate 'Fido is a dog' in a truth theory would not per se tell us the first thing about how to accommodate that sentence in a *meaning* theory. So how can knowing how to accommodate *belief ascriptions* in a truth theory tell us how to accommodate *any* sentence in a meaning theory?

I shall forgo a general answer, but we can see straightway how the hidden-indexical theory of belief ascription constrains the nature of a meaning theory. For what applies to belief ascriptions applies, *mutatis mutandis*, to all propositional-attitude ascriptions involving 'that'-clauses. What holds for 'Ralph believes that Fido is a dog' also holds for 'Ralph says that Fido is a dog'. The theory tells us that the 'that'-clause in a saying ascription refers to a Kaplan proposition. This means that to know what a speaker said in the utterance of a sentence is to know what Kaplan proposition she said. Since to understand a language is to have the ability to understand utterances in it, and since to understand an utterance is to know what the speaker said in it, we can see that, if the hidden-indexical theory is correct, then the main task of a compositional meaning theory for a language will be the construction of a finitely specifiable correlation that relates each sentence of the language to what Kaplan has called a *character*—a function that, in effect, maps each utterance of the sentence onto the Kaplan proposition that is the propositional object of the primary speech act performed in the utterance.<sup>23</sup> In other words, if the hidden-indexical theory of the accommodation of propositional-attitude ascriptions in a truth theory is correct, then so is the "direct reference" approach to a compositional mean-

<sup>23</sup> Kaplan, "Dthat," in P. Cole, ed., *Syntax and Semantics 9: Pragmatics* (New York: Academic, 1978).

ing theory, and in this way we can see how the hidden-indexical theory constrains the nature of a meaning theory.

It may be worth noting that this point I have been laboring reverses the usual procedure of those who argue for the direct reference treatment of 'that'-clauses implied by the hidden-indexical theory. That procedure begins by assuming a direct reference approach to meaning and then draws the consequence as regards the propositional content of propositional-attitude ascriptions, which consequence entails that 'that'-clauses are referential singular terms whose referents are Kaplan propositions. My procedure has been different, and I think less contentious. I started with no assumptions about "content" or meaning. My question was wholly about the *references* that must be assigned to words in a belief ascription on the assumption that languages had compositional *truth* theories, theories whose theorems are of the extensional paradigm

'La neige est blanche' is true in French iff snow is white.

It was then argued that, relative to the assumption, 'that'-clauses had to be construed as referential singular terms whose *referents* are Kaplan propositions. Then, in the final step, this premise about *reference* was used to derive the general point about *meaning*.

#### V. CONCLUSION

If the hidden-indexical theory is correct, then we not only know how to accommodate belief ascriptions in a compositional truth theory for English, we also know the form that a compositional meaning theory for English must take. But I did not argue that the hidden-indexical theory is correct. I merely argued that it is the correct theory relative to the assumption that natural languages have compositional truth theories, and I proceeded to raise problems for the theory. There are but three possible ways out of this impasse: either the problems can be answered, or the hidden-indexical theory is not the best accommodation of belief sentences in a compositional truth theory, or natural languages such as English do not have compositional truth theories. Elsewhere I have argued that the third option is one that deserves to be taken seriously.<sup>24</sup> Others may disagree; but I hope it will be agreed that the hidden-indexical theory and its obstacles present a challenge that cannot be ignored.

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<sup>24</sup> *Remnants of Meaning*; "Does Mentalese Have a Compositional Semantics?" in B. Loewer and G. Rey, eds., *Meaning in Mind: Essays on the Work of Jerry Fodor* (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1991); and "Actual-Language Relations," forthcoming in *Philosophical Perspectives*, VII (1993).