NAMING AND KNOWING

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I

S UPPOSE that, having read his Kripke, the ubiquitous Ralph were to say, "There is some one person who murdered Smith, and I hereby name and rigidly designate that person 'Vladimir.' "

Donnellan, in "The Contingent *A Priori* and Rigid Designators,"[1] would allow that Ralph has introduced "Vladimir" as a rigid designator of Smith's murderer, and that he knows that the sentence

(1) If some one person murdered Smith, Vladimir murdered Smith

expresses a truth, provided he knows that some one person murdered Smith. But while Ralph knows that (1) expresses a truth, he does not, according to Donnellan, know the truth (1) expresses; and since he does not know it, he does not know it *a priori*.

I, too, believe that Kripke has failed to show that there is any contingent proposition that can be known *a priori*, but not for the reason Donnellan gives. One of my reasons (others come later), one which Donnellan would certainly accept, is this. If t is a name of x (and not equivalent in meaning to a definite description necessarily true of x), and S(t) is a sentence in which t occurs, and ⌜Ralph knows that S(t)⌝ attributes to Ralph knowledge of a proposition that is contingent because there is a possible world in which x does not satisfy the propositional function expressed by S( ), then ⌜Ralph knows that S(t)⌝ attributes to Ralph *de re* knowledge of x. But no such knowledge—when it is of a contingently existing thing—can be *a priori*, no matter what names one has, or how they have been introduced.

Kripke would have us believe that

(2) Ralph knows that Vladimir murdered Smith, if any one did

attributes to Ralph knowledge that he has *a priori*, because of the way he fixed the reference of "Vladimir," but also attributes to Ralph knowledge of a contingent proposition—for "Vladimir" rigidly designates whoever in this world murdered Smith, and there is a possible world in which that person is innocent of Smith's murder.

Kripke cannot have it both ways. If (2) attributes to Ralph knowledge of a proposition that is contingent because the person who in fact murdered Smith might not have, then "Vladimir" in (2) refers to that person, and (2) attributes to Ralph *de re* knowledge of that person—specifically, the knowledge that that person murdered Smith, if anyone did. Now I do not mind saying that Smith's murderer is known by Ralph to have murdered Smith, and, if Ralph can reason a little, to have murdered Smith if anyone did. But if Ralph has this knowledge, *he has it just by virtue of knowing that some one person murdered Smith, and not at all by virtue of having named Smith's murderer "Vladimir."* Yet Ralph's knowledge that some one person murdered Smith is certainly something that he has only *a posteriori*, and so, therefore, is his knowledge, of Smith's murderer, that that person murdered Smith—if Ralph has that knowledge.

This objection to Kripke on the contingent *a priori* implies an objection, to be developed later, to Kripke on the necessary *a posteriori*. Now, however, I want to turn to the issues raised by Donnellan's paper.

II

Nowadays it is fashionable, in certain quarters, to think of propositional attitudes as being triadic relations of the form

$$P(x, F^n, \langle y_1 \ . \ . \ . \ y_n \rangle),$$

relating a person x to an n-ary intension and an n-ary sequence of items. When n = o the relation is purely *de dicto*, otherwise *de re*. But one sympathetic to this idea might do things a little differently; one might recognize at least two relations corresponding to each propositional attitude verb, one *de dicto*, the other *de re*. The *de dicto* relation is a dyadic relation between a person and a o-ary intension, what many call a proposition, but which we will do better to call a *general proposition*—a proposition having only intensions as constituents. The *de re* relation is also a dyadic relation, of the form

$$^r P(x, \langle F^n, \langle y_1 \ . \ . \ . \ y_n \rangle \rangle)$$

(where F^n is a non-o-ary propositional function), and relates a person x to what we may call a *singular proposition*—a proposition true in a possible world if and only if its n-ary sequence satisfies its n-ary intension in that world.[2]

As we shall presently see, recognition of these relations need not, in itself, commit one to any particular theory of the logical form of propositional attitude *sentences*, and Donnellan himself has suggested that the proposition expressed by the sentence "Socrates is snub-nosed" might be represented as an ordered pair consisting of Socrates and the property of being snub-nosed.[3] It will therefore be useful to restate the three central theses of his paper in the following way.

(T₁) Ordinary proper names—that is to say, those that do not abbreviate definite descriptions—rigidly designate their bearers.

(T₂) If t rigidly designates x, and if t is not a definite description necessarily true of whatever it denotes, then the proposition expressed by a sentence containing t is a singular proposition containing x, and, therefore, to have any propositional attitude towards this proposition is to have a *de re* propositional attitude about x.[4] (Thus, to know

the proposition expressed by "Vladimir is a murderer" is to know of Smith's murderer that he is a murderer, to assert this proposition is to assert of Smith's murderer that he is a murderer, and to know what proposition this sentence expresses is to know of Smith's murderer that the sentence "says" of him that he is a murderer.)

(T₃) There is a relation, which we might call *rapport*, such that the condition for being in a position to have any *de re* propositional attitude about a thing is that one be *en rapport* with it. Donnellan does not tell us what this relation is, but he would tell us that Ralph, merely by knowing that some one person murdered Smith, is not *en rapport* with Smith's murderer, and that Leverrier, merely by having known that some one planet was the cause of the perturbations in the orbit of Uranus, was not *en rapport* with Neptune.

Kripke, of course, accepts (T₁), and it is difficult, if not impossible, to see how *he* could reject (T₂). But, even if he were to concede that to know the truth expressed by a sentence containing a name is to have *de re* knowledge of the bearer of the name that could not have been acquired merely by the bestowal of the name, he still need not accept (T₃), or at least that part of it that withholds *de re* knowledge of Smith's murderer from Ralph, or of Neptune from Leverrier. He might insist that if one knows that something is uniquely φ, then one knows of the φ that it is the φ; in fact, as we shall later see, if Kripke does not hold this, or something pretty close to it, he will have to give up his claim that certain propositions about natural kinds are both necessary and known *a posteriori*.[5]

For my own part, I cannot accept (T₃). I can accept (T₁), properly understood, but then, so understood, I cannot accept (T₂). I can accept (T₂), if it is intended merely as a definition, but then I cannot accept (T₁). In the end, the theory of reference and names that I should prefer would be rather different from the one Donnellan and Kripke offer; it would find no indispensable use for singular propositions or *de re* propositional attitudes.

In the next section I shall give an interpretation of (T₁) which I can accept, but from which (T₂) does not follow. In Section IV I shall give an account of *de re* propositional attitudes in which (T₃) is false, and in which (T₂) is false when "rigid designator" is understood in the way that makes (T₁) true.

III

A term t rigidly designates a thing x if t designates x in every possible world in which t designates anything. But what does this mean?

> When I say that a designator is rigid, and designates the same thing in all possible worlds, I mean that, as used in *our* language, it stands for that thing, when *we* talk about counterfactual situations.[6]

By this criterion, which I will designate "C_1," t rigidly designates x if, for every sentence of the form ʹIt might have been the case that t . . .ʹ, there is no reading in which t does not designate x. By C_1, "Gerald Ford" is a rigid designator, but not "the President of the U.S. in 1976": "It might have been the case that the President of the U.S. in 1976 was a lapsed Quaker" has a reading in which Ford is not designated, but "It might have been the case that Gerald Ford was a lapsed Quaker" has no such reading.

But (T₂), considered as a definition, suggests another criterion, C_2: t rigidly designates x if, for any sentence S(t) in which t occurs, the proposition expressed by S(t) is true in a possible world if and only if x satisfies in that world the propositional function expressed by S( ).

We owe to Kripke the insight that names are rigid designators in the sense of C_1—apart from a few special constructions, an unambiguous name does designate its bearer in every sentence in which it occurs. But from this it does not follow that names are rigid designators in the sense of C_2, and I believe that in fact they are not.

It is obvious that a term may be a rigid designator by C_1 without being one by C_2.[7] Let "*" be an operator that transforms a definite description into one that has maximal scope in every sentence in which it occurs. Then "the* President of the U.S. in 1976" will be a rigid designator by C_1, though not by C_2: "It might have been the case that the* President of the U.S. in 1976 was a lapsed Quaker" has no reading in which Ford is not designated, yet the general proposition expressed by this sentence is true in a possible world if and only if whoever in that world is President of the U.S. in 1976 is such that he or she might have been a lapsed Quaker.[8]

Moving closer to names, we might notice that there is a platitude about them that suggests a semantic principle which entails that names are rigid designators in the sense of C_1, but does not entail that they are rigid designators in the sense of C_2. The platitude is that the *raison d'être* of names is to enable us to refer to their bearers—it is not *the raison d'être* of descriptions to enable us to refer to the things that happen to satisfy them. Spelling out this platitude, I would suggest that, roughly speaking, what makes t a name of x in a group G is that there is a convention in G to refer to x by t; when a member of G utters a sentence containing t he is taken to be referring to x just because it is mutual knowledge among the members of G that the only relevant fact about t is that members of G use it to refer to x.[9] The semantic principle this platitude suggests is that to use a name literally, one must intend to refer to a bearer of the name—unless one means that the name lacks a certain bearer it was thought to have. Names will be rigid designators in the sense of C_1 for anyone who accepts this principle, and the principle may be accepted by one who denies that names are rigid designators in the sense of C_2. It may even be accepted by one who holds, rather implausibly I should think, that the meaning of a name is an individual concept; this person will hold that for every name t there is a predicate ϕ such that t is synonymous with ⌜the* ϕ⌝.

All this, of course, does nothing to show that names are not rigid designators in the sense of C_2; to show that, we need to show the connection between reference and meaning, and between meaning and propositional attitudes, and between *de re* and *de dicto* propositional attitudes; rather a lot, and too much for these pages. So let us turn to (T_3) and the issue of *de re* propositional attitudes.

IV

Suppose that Ralph, having named Smith's murderer "Vladimir," goes on to say,

(1) Vladimir is insane.

I am supposing that Donnellan and Kripke would agree that (1) expresses the singular proposition ⟨x is insane, Smith's murderer⟩, and that to believe this proposition is to believe of Smith's murderer that he is insane; and I am further supposing that, while Donnellan would deny that

(2) Smith's murderer is believed by Ralph to be insane

is true, Kripke might insist that it is true.

Well, who is right? Is (2) true, or is it false? The question, I feel, is misconceived; the misconception is that (2), *qua* sentence-type and apart from context, expresses a proposition and is either true or false. On the other hand, the supposedly equivalent

    (3) $^{r}B(Ralph, \langle x\ is\ insane, Smith's\ murderer \rangle)$

is true or false, and if the question is which, the answer, I think, must be that it is true. It is, then, a mistake — as I shall try to show — to suppose that (2) and (3) are equivalent.

    There is nothing to prevent anyone from recognizing at a certain level of analysis a *de re* belief relation of the form

    (4) $^{r}B(x, \langle F^{n}, \langle y_1\ .\ .\ .\ y_n \rangle \rangle)$.

Then, however, there is another relation that must also be recognized, one we might call "the belief-of-under-a-mode-of-presentation relation," and represent as

    (5) $^{u}B(x, \langle F^{n}, \langle y_1\ .\ .\ .\ y_n \rangle \rangle, \langle m_1\ .\ .\ .\ m_n \rangle)$.

For the moment I shall rely on the reader's intuitive understanding, and not try to say what a mode of presentation is, or what it is to believe something of a thing under a mode of presentation. Clearly, some such notion is required, however it is ultimately explicated.

    As regards the relation between (4) and (5), I submit that, necessarily, to have a belief about a thing is to have a belief about it under a mode of presentation, and that one may believe a thing to be such and such under one mode of presentation while disbelieving it to be such and such under another, and neither believing nor disbelieving it to be such and such under still another. For example, Jones is believed by Thelma to be a purse-snatcher under the mode of presentation *man she saw fleeing with her purse*, disbelieved by her to be a purse-snatcher under the mode of presentation *man she saw genuflecting*, and neither believed nor disbelieved by her to be a purse-snatcher under the mode of presentation *man she saw at the police station*. Similarly, Chopin is believed by Thelma to be Polish under the mode of presentation *famous composer named "Chopin,"* but not under the mode of presentation *composer of the music to which she is listening*.

    From this it follows that ^{u}B, not ^{r}B, is the fundamental *de re* relation, and that

    $^{r}B(x, \langle F^{n}, \langle y_1,\ .\ .\ .\ y_n \rangle \rangle)$ iff $(\exists m_1\ .\ .\ .\ m_n)\ ^{u}B(x, \langle F^{n}, \langle y_1\ .\ .\ .\ y_n \rangle \rangle, \langle m_1\ .\ .\ .\ m_n \rangle)$.

    And now I am in a position to pursue my suggestion that (2) expresses no proposition and is therefore neither true nor false. The idea is that (2) contains an implicit indexical component requiring reference to a mode of presentation or a type of mode of presentation. The idea, more generally, is that whenever a speaker assertively utters a sentence of the form ^{r}so-and-so believes t is such-and-such^{1}, where t is a singular term used by the speaker to refer to a thing x, then there is a mode of presentation, or a type of mode of presentation, such that the speaker's utterance is true if, and only if, so-and-so believes x to be such-and-such under that mode of presentation, or under a mode of presentation of that type. Furthermore, the mode of presentation, or type of mode of presentation, is never conventionally determined by the meaning of the sentence uttered. One utterance of "Quine is believed by Ralph to be a mystic" may be true only if Ralph believes Quine to be a mystic under the mode of presentation *author of The Ways of Paradox*, while another utterance of this sentence, by the same or a different speaker, may be true only if Ralph believes Quine to be a mystic under the mode of presentation *man seen by Ralph sitting in a lotus position*.[10] What mode of presentation or type of mode of presentation the speaker means will be inferred, by the hearer, on the basis of (a) the sentence uttered, and (b) the mutual knowledge the speaker and hearer have about what

modes of presentation would be relevant to their present concerns, and about what ones the speaker is likely to know the believer to have.

Here are a few considerations in favor of an implicit indexical treatment of sentences like (2).

(a) The police, indicating a certain man, ask Thelma if that man snatched her purse, and she replies, "I've no idea; I neither believe that he did, nor that he didn't." Let us restate the first part of Thelma's utterance as

(6) It is not the case that I believe that that man snatched my purse.

I want to say that her utterance of (6) is (i) literal, (ii) *de re* (that is to say, that "that man" refers to that man), (iii) true, and (iv) the assertion of the logical negation of what she would have asserted had she uttered "I believe that that man snatched my purse."[11] And I want to say all this even though I happen to know that this man is the man Thelma saw in the alley, that Thelma believes that the man she saw in the alley snatched her purse, and that this belief is *de re*. But I fail to see how all this could be true if a literal utterance of (6) did not require reference to a mode of presentation or a type of mode of presentation.

Perhaps it will be objected that Thelma was speaking literally, but falsely; that, unbeknown to her, she really does believe the man to have snatched her purse. But this objection is plausible only if we suppose Thelma to be incapable of the most elementary reasoning. If Thelma was speaking literally, and if a literal utterance of (6) required her to mean that there was no mode of presentation under which she believed the man to have snatched her purse, then she ought to have said that she believed him *not* to have snatched it, and not that she neither believed nor disbelieved that he did. For she does know that there is a mode of presentation under which she believes the purse-snatcher to have snatched her purse; so, if she believes that there is no mode of presentation under which she believes the man she is looking at to have snatched her purse, then she ought to be capable of inferring that he is not the purse-snatcher.

Perhaps it will be objected that "that man" in the utterance of (6) is functioning not as a true demonstrative, but rather as a "demonstrative of laziness," and that what Thelma really means by her utterance of (6) is that it is not the case that she believes (*de dicto*) that the man she is looking at snatched her purse.

I do not mind saying that this was part of what was meant, or at least implied; I do mind saying that the utterance of (6) is not as *bona fide* a *de re* attribution as anything one is likely to find; if it is not, one is not likely to find any. Nor should it be surprising that a *de re* attribution would imply a *de dicto* attribution; for if Thelma knows that there is one man she is looking at, and doubts that the man she is looking at snatched her purse, then surely it follows that she doubts of that man, under the mode of presentation *man she is looking at*, that he snatched her purse.

(b) In a conversation concerning what Thelma was likely to have observed at the purse-snatching, the culprit might well say, "She knows that I limp." But in a conversation in which the concern is the likelihood of her identifying the purse-snatcher with the man she saw genuflecting, he might well say, "She doesn't know that I limp." Surely, both utterances would be *de re* attributions; surely, both would be literal and true; surely, that could be so only if two modes of presentation are implicitly referred to by the two utterances.

(c) Donnellan implies (on p. 22) that the occurrence of names in propositional attitude contexts presents a problem for the kind of theory he and Kripke hold, and it is not difficult to see why. Since Bernie Schwartz is Tony Curtis, then, on their kind of theory,

(7) Bernie Schwartz is an actor

and

(8) Tony Curtis is an actor

have the same meaning—both express the singular proposition ⟨*x is an actor*, the person named "Bernie Schwartz" and "Tony Curtis"⟩. But if (7) and (8) have the same meaning, then

(9) Ralph believes that Bernie Schwartz is an actor

and

(10) Ralph believes that Tony Curtis is an actor

ought to have the same meaning. And yet, it would seem, an utterance of (9) might be false and an utterance of (10) true, and this even when it is clear that both utterances are intended as *de re* attributions. The problem is to see how this could be. But it could be if, as I suggest, the sentence-types (9) and (10) express no propositions, but require reference to a contextually determined mode of presentation or type of mode of presentation.

So much for why (2) expresses neither a truth nor a falsehood; from here it is not difficult to prove that (3) is true.

(i) (3) is true if

(11) (∃m) ᵘB(Ralph,⟨*x is insane*, Smith's murderer⟩, m)

is true.

(ii) (11) is true if, given our story, there could be a true, literal utterance of ⌜Ralph believes t is insane⌝, where t is any singular term used by the speaker to designate Smith's murderer.

(iii) There could be such an utterance.

(iv) Therefore, (3) is true.

I will say nothing about (i); concerning (ii), I will say only that we must not lose sight of the fact that the only reason we have for distinguishing a *de re*—that is to say, a relational—concept of belief is that singular terms do sometimes occur referentially in contexts of the sort we have been considering. As regards (iii), we need only to suppose that it is published in the newspapr that Ralph, a famous sleuth, is confident that Smith's murderer is insane; then we may easily imagine the following utterances.

Smith's murderer to his moll: "Ralph believes that I'm insane."

His moll to one of the mob: "Ralph thinks that Big Felix is insane."

Ralph to Smith's murderer upon apprehending him: "I've believed all along that you were insane."

To my mind, these utterances, like the previous examples, would be true, literal, and as *bona fide de re* as anything ordinary language has to offer. Needless to say, what applies to belief applies, *mutatis mutandis*, to every other propositional attitude.

Perhaps Donnellan will concede all this, so far as it goes, but protest that he could not care less about the vagaries of *de re* attributions, that the important point, the only one on which he needs absolutely to insist, is that the relation he calls *rapport* is such that (a) if x is *en rapport* with y, then x has knowledge of y under a mode of presentation of a certain special kind—perhaps, he might insist, knowledge that is not reducible to any knowledge by description, (b) Ralph is not *en rapport* with Smith's murderer, nor was Leverrier with Neptune, and so on, and (c) there is no hope of providing an adequate

semantical theory of ordinary names (let alone of the referential-attributive distinction) that is not in terms of the *rapport* relation.

Were this the occasion to argue a reply, and so to develop the line already adumbrated, these, baldly stated, are a few of the points I should argue for.

1. Each person has knowledge of himself that is not knowledge by description, each person has, so to say, primitive and irreducible knowledge of himself under the mode of presentation *conscious thing*; but no one can have knowledge of a material particular other than himself that is not knowledge by description. That is, knowing oneself to be such and such, in the relevant sense, is not a matter of there being some purely general property ϕ such that (i) one is uniquely ϕ and (ii) one knows, *de dicto*, that the ϕ is such and such. But, for any material particular x other than oneself, if there is a mode of presentation m such that one knows x to be such and such under m, then there is a relation R such that (a) x is uniquely R to oneself, (b) one knows that whatever is uniquely R to oneself is such and such, and, (c), (a) and (b) entail that one knows x to be such and such under m.[12] Then—given any view of event or state-individuation, except one that finds a different state for each description of a state—it follows that one's knowing x to be such and such under m is identical with one's knowing that whatever is uniquely R to oneself is such and such; there is, in other words, a single state that is both a knowing of x that it is such and such and a knowing that whatever is uniquely R to oneself is such and such, and the former description of this state applies by virtue of the application of the latter description.

A few examples will not be amiss.

(i) I am at this moment looking at a red cup. I know of this cup, under the mode of presentation *cup that I am looking at*, that it is red, and this is just because I know that whatever cup I am uniquely looking at is red.

(ii) I have a dim visual image of a man; it is a memory image of a certain man because it was caused by a visual perception of that man; because I know that there is some one person that my image is of, I have knowledge of that person under the mode of presentation *person my image is of*.

(iii) Kripke and Donnellan adduce examples to show that one can refer to a thing by a name, assert and know things about it, even though the referent of the name is not fixed by any description, not even one containing a reference to the user of the name. I am unconvinced. Their examples, it seems to me, are not unlike the memory-image example. It is true that Ralph uses the name "Arnold Schoenberg" to refer to the composer, and that he knows that Schoenberg was a composer, and that that is nearly all he knows. Not, however, quite all he knows. Ralph knows that there was just one person such that (a) there is a convention to refer to that person by the name "Arnold Schoenberg," and that (b) his familiarity with the name, as the name of a composer, derives from his having encountered references to that person by that name. If Ralph did not have this knowledge he could not use "Arnold Schoenberg" to refer to Arnold Schoenberg, nor, in using the name, could he be said to be expressing beliefs about him.

2. The condition for being in a position to have any *de re* propositional attitude about a thing under a certain mode of presentation is that one have knowledge of that thing under that mode of presentation—which is to say that the *de re* element in any propositional attitude is captured by one's having knowledge of the relevant thing under a certain mode of presentation. (I am for the present being a little cautious.)

This, together with point 1. above, effects a reduction of each *de re* propositional attitude to a propositional attitude that is wholly *de dicto*, save for its self-ascriptive component.

3. Given the theory of *de re* propositional attitude sentences as containing an implicit

indexical component I can afford to be outrageously generous in ascribing *de re* attitudes. Let Ralph, who knows only that there is a shortest spy, be said to know of the shortest spy, under the mode of presentation *shortest spy*, that he is a spy; still we may account for why one cannot say "There is someone whom Ralph believes to be a spy." It is not that the sentence is false; the *sentence* is neither true nor false. It is rather that to make a certain assertion one must intend one's audience to take one as making that assertion, and one cannot be taken as asserting what is mutually known to be both uninteresting and already known. Given Ralph's rather limited knowledge, the only true assertion one could possibly make in uttering "There is someone whom Ralph believes to be a spy" would be neither interesting nor informative.

4. For each language there is a set of conventions such that to know the meaning of any sentence in that language is just to know what propositional attitudes—more specifically, and contentiously, what audience-directed communication intentions—an utterer of that sentence must have in order to be conforming to those conventions. And to know the meaning of a word or an expression is just to know what conventional contributions it makes to the meanings of the sentences in which it occurs.

Two consequences of 1.–4. are worth making explicit. The first, which is obvious, is that to give the semantics of proper names, and of sentences containing them, one need have no recourse to singular propositions and *de re* propositional attitudes, save those that are self-ascriptive. The second, which may take a little more argument, is that one could have no *useful* recourse to them—the flaccidity of *de re* discourse cannot bear the weight of a theory of reference.[13]

None of this, I must add, commits me to the theory that names abbreviate descriptions, or even clusters of them; while I subscribe to the theory of propositional attitudes that led Russell to his theory of ordinary names, I do not subscribe to his theory of ordinary names; nor, for that matter, to his theory of logically proper names.

V

Having begun with the contingent *a priori*, let us end with the necessary *a posteriori*.

Ralph, writing in his diary, introduced the name "Amanda," fixing its reference by the description "the person I met on Tuesday"; later he introduced the name "Vince" by the description "the person I met on Friday." Now he is nonplussed at discovering that the person he met on Tuesday is the person he met on Friday, and Kripke would have it that

(1) Ralph knows that, if Amanda exists, Amanda is Vince

attributes to Ralph *a posteriori* knowledge of a necessary proposition. The knowledge is *a posteriori* because of Ralph's empirical discovery and the way he has fixed the references of "Amanda" and "Vince." The proposition known is necessary, for it is the one we represent as

(2) $\langle$*if x exists*, $x = y$, $\langle$the person Ralph met on Tuesday and Friday, the person Ralph met on Tuesday and Friday$\rangle\rangle$,

which, suitably interpreted, is true in all possible worlds.

Kripke, so it would seem, would also have it that even before (1) was true,

(3) Ralph knows that, if Amanda exists, Amanda is Amanda

was true, and attributed to Ralph *a priori* knowledge of a necessary proposition—namely, he must say, (2).

We are in a position to observe that Kripke's claims are neither as significant, nor as absurd, as they might appear to be.

First of all, the fact that Ralph's empirical discovery results in his knowledge of (2) has nothing whatever to do with his having named anyone anything. There could be this result only if Ralph's knowledge of (2) — that is, his knowing of the person twice met that that person is self-identical, if that person exists — is entailed by his knowledge that

(4) there is just one person whom he met on both Tuesday and Friday, and who is such that, if that person exists, that person is self-identical.

But if Ralph's knowledge of (4) entails his knowledge of (2), then there is a single state of Ralph's that is both a knowing of (4) and a knowing of (2), and the former description of this state entails the latter description of this state. Now this particular knowing of (2) — there will of course be numerous others — may be said to be *a posteriori* because it is identical with the *a posteriori* knowledge of the contingent proposition (4), and because the description of this state as a knowing of (2) follows from its description as a knowing of (4).

I do not disagree that there is, in the foregoing sense, *a posteriori* knowledge of necessary propositions; only I think it is a sense best described as Pickwickian.[14]

As regards Kripke's claims about (3), he does not contradict himself in saying, as he would have to say, that (3), but not (1), attributes to Ralph *a priori* knowledge of (2). For it is true, or so I am committed to saying, that an utterance of (3) would attribute to Ralph a different knowing of (2) than would an utterance of (1), one that is identical with his knowing that the person he met on Tuesday is such that, if that person exists, that person is self-identical. However, while Kripke's claims about (1) and (3) are not (charitably interpreted) inconsistent, it is false that an utterance of (3) would attribute *a priori* knowledge to Ralph — Ralph only knows *a posteriori* that there is just one person whom he met on Tuesday, and who is such that, if he or she exists, he or she is self-identical.

Somewhat different issues arise when we consider Kripke's claims about the necessary *a posteriori* as regards natural kind terms; here we shall see the importance, for Kripke, of Donnellan's (T_3), and of the two senses of "rigid designator."

His thesis is that a natural kind term is a rigid designator of a natural kind, one whose reference is fixed by an accidental description, and that, because of this, certain propositions are necessary, but known *a posteriori*. A good example is the proposition expressed by the sentence

(i) Every whale is a mammal.

It is, and this I will not dispute, known *a posteriori*, and it is, Kripke claims, necessarily true — there is no possible world in which a thing is a whale but not a mammal. Now "whale," for Kripke, rigidly designates the natural kind to which all and only whales belong (which we may call "the species of whales"), and "mammal" the natural kind to which all and only mammals belong (which we may call "the genus of mammals"),[15] and the proposition expressed by (i), Kripke would say, is true in a possible world w if and only if whatever in w belongs to the species to which whales in the actual world belong, belongs to the genus to which mammals in the actual world belong. So "whale" and "mammal" are rigid designators in the sense of C_2, and the proposition expressed by (i) is the one we represent as

(ii) ⟨*whatever belongs to x, belongs to y*, ⟨the species of whales, the genus of mammals⟩⟩.

What makes this proposition necessarily true is that the internal properties by virtue of which a thing belongs to the species of whales include the internal properties by virtue of which a thing belongs to the genus of mammals.

To have knowledge of (ii) is to have *de re* knowledge of the species of whales, and this is not anything Kripke would wish to deny; he would certainly say that in the sentence "Ralph knows that every whale is a mammal," "whale" refers to the species of whales. But what is a species?

Two animals belong to the same species, or natural kind, provided that there are certain internal properties which account for certain facts about both of them—certain of their observable characteristics, their procreative abilities, internal structures, and so on. Let Φ be the conjunction of those internal properties by virtue of which something is a whale, and L the conjunction of natural laws by virtue of which Φ accounts for the relevant facts about whales. Roughly speaking, the species of whales will be something which determines that function which assigns to each possible world the set of things in that world that are Φ, provided that Φ is governed in that world by L. So we might represent the species of whales as the couple $\langle \Phi, L \rangle$. Likewise, there will be a Φ' and an L' such that $\langle \Phi', L' \rangle$ represents the genus of mammals, and the proposition allegedly expressed by (i) may now be represented as

(iii) *⟨whatever belongs to x, belongs to y,* $\langle \langle \Phi, L \rangle, \langle \Phi', L' \rangle \rangle \rangle$.

Since Φ' is entailed by Φ, and L' by L, (iii) is necessarily true.

Perhaps it will be said that nothing could be a whale if it were not the progeny of the relevant ancestors of our whales. If that is so, then we may take the species of whales to be the couple $\langle A, R \rangle$, where A is the set of relevant ancestors, and R that relation which a thing must have to A to be a whale. None of this matters terribly to the only point I am here concerned to make: Kripke must maintain that to know the proposition expressed by (i) is to have *de re* knowledge of the internal properties, or of the relevant ancestors, or of both. Yet we are hardly *en rapport* with either the properties or the ancestors; the most we know is that there are internal properties constitutive of the species of whales, and that there are remote ancestors of our whales. This is why Kripke cannot readily accept Donnellan's thesis (T_3).

It is, however, a very compelling idea, the idea that the criterion for being a whale is being of the same species as those things paradigmatically referred to as whales; it does seem nearly to be true that we would not class a thing as a whale, no matter how like one it was in appearance, if it were, say, a fish, and not of the same species as paradigm whales. This compelling idea, appropriately generalized, is the *only* basis Kripke has for his thesis about natural kind terms and the propositions expressed by the sentences containing them. Yet this idea in no way entails the theses Kripke derives from it; it is compatible with, and in fact suggests, the hypothesis that natural kind terms are rigid designators by C_1, but not by C_2, of natural kinds. And this hypothesis does not entail that the proposition expressed by (i) is necessarily true, although, as we shall presently see, it does entail that the proposition expressed by the *sentence*

(iv) Necessarily, every whale is a mammal

is true!

"The original concept of [whale]," Kripke writes, "is: *that kind of thing*, where the kind can be identified by paradigmatic instances."[16] What he means, of course, is that the original concept of whale is *thing of the same kind as this thing*. It is as if the word "whale" got introduced by our coming across certain hitherto unknown sea-dwelling

creatures, which we assumed to belong to a single species, and saying, "Let's call something a 'whale' if it belongs to the species of these creatures—whatever that species turns out to be."

Now this picture suggests that the proposition expressed by, say, "Moby is a whale," is not, as Kripke would have it,

⟨x belongs to y, ⟨Moby, the species of those creatures from which our use of "whale" derives⟩⟩,

but rather one that is better represented as

⟨x belongs to the species of the members of y, ⟨Moby, the set of those creatures, etc.⟩⟩;

it suggests, then, that the proposition expressed by (i) is not (ii), but rather

(v) ⟨whatever belongs to the species of the members of x, belongs to the genus of the members of y, ⟨the set of creatures from which our use of "whale" derives, the set of creatures from which our use of "mammal" derives⟩⟩.[17]

Some will welcome this revision because it will allow them to say that to know the truth expressed by (i) one need not have *de re* knowledge of the species of whales. But that is not what interests me.

The difference between (ii) and (v) is this: for every possible world w, (ii) is true in w iff whatever belongs in w to the species *in the actual world* of those creatures in the actual world from which our use of "whale" derives, belongs in w to the genus in the actual world of those creatures in the actual world from which our use of "mammal" derives; but, for every possible world w, (v) is true in w iff whatever belongs in w to the species *in w* of those creatures in the actual world from which our use of "whale" derives, belongs in w to the genus in w of those creatures in the actual world from which our use of "mammal" derives.

Is it logically possible for something which is in fact a whale to cease to be a whale and become, say, a fish? If so, then (v) is not necessarily true—there will be a possible world w' in which those things that are whales in this world are fish in w', but in which all other mammals are mammals, and in w' (v) is false.

There are, I know, those who would claim that whales are necessarily whales, that if a thing is a whale, then there is no possible world in which that thing is not a whale—and Kripke, from some of his remarks, appears to be among them. Yet I know of no convincing reason to think that this essentialist thesis is true; it seems perfectly conceivable to me—for whatever conceivability is worth—that a whale should metamorphose right before my eyes into a fish, and so I am inclined to deny that the proposition expressed by (i) is necessarily true.

And yet, the picture that suggests that we would do better to take (v) rather then (ii) as the proposition expressed by (i) also suggests that "whale" is a rigid designator in the sense of C_1 of the species of whales. This means that (iv)—"Necessarily, every whale is a mammal"—remains true even if my intuitions have not been corrupted by a surfeit of werewolf movies. For if natural kind terms are rigid designators by C_1, but not by C_2, of natural kinds, then the proposition expressed by (iv) is

⟨the species of the members of x and the genus of the members of y are such that, necessarily, whatever belongs to the former, belongs to the latter, ⟨the set of creatures from which our use of "whale" derives, the set of creatures from which our use of "mammal" derives⟩⟩.

And while this proposition may be false in some possible worlds, it is at least true in this the actual world.[18]

FOOTNOTES

[1] This volume, pp. 12–27.

[2] We need not recognize two relations; we could instead speak of a single relation that has in its range both general and singular propositions, but for present purposes the former way of speaking is more useful. The labels "general proposition" and "singular proposition" are borrowed from David Kaplan's "How to Russell a Frege-Church," *The Journal of Philosophy*, 72 (1975): 716–729.

[3] Keith S. Donnellan, "Speaking of Nothing," *The Philosophical Review*, 83 (1974): 3–31, esp. 11–12.

[4] This formulation is intended to capture two theses implicit in Donnellan's paper: (1) if t rigidly designates x, then the proposition expressed by a sentence S(t) in which t occurs is true in a possible world iff x satisfies in that world the propositional function expressed by S( ); (2) if t rigidly designates x, then to know the proposition expressed by a sentence containing t is to have *de re* knowledge of x, *unless* t is a definite description necessarily true of whatever it denotes, such as "the square root of 25." (While "The square root of 25 is odd" is true in a possible world iff 5 is odd in that world, the proposition expressed by this sentence is not a singular proposition containing the number 5.)

[5] David Kaplan, in his famous unpublication "Dthat," clearly implies that he would accept (T_1) and (T_2), but reject (T_3), and this without any concern for either the contingent *a priori* or the necessary *a posteriori*. Kaplan's position, with respect to definite descriptions, implies that whether an utterance of the form "the F is G" is attributive or referential depends only on whether the utterer intends to be asserting the general proposition *the F is G*, which is true in a possible world w iff the F in w is G in w, or the singular proposition $\langle Gx$, the F$\rangle$, which is true in a possible world w iff the F in the actual world is G in w.

[6] Saul A. Kripke, "Naming and Necessity," in *Semantics of Natural Language*, eds. D. Davidson and G. Harman (Dordrecht, 1972), p. 289.

[7] I admit to having conflated C_1 and C_2 until Brian Loar pointed out to me that the thesis that names are equivalent to descriptions that take wide scope is immune to Kripke's rigid designator argument which purports to show that names cannot be equivalent in meaning to descriptions; see Loar's "The Semantics of Singular Terms," forthcoming in *Philosophical Studies*.

[8] Whereas "*" transforms a term into a rigid designator in the sense of C_1, David Kaplan's "dthat" operator transforms a term into a rigid designator in the sense of C_2: "It might have been the case that dthat-the President of the U.S. in 1976 was a lapsed Quaker" expresses the singular proposition $\langle x$ *might have been a lapsed Quaker*, the President of the U.S. in 1976$\rangle$.

[9] The account of names alluded to here would parallel the account of non-composite whole-utterance types that I offer in *Meaning* (Oxford, 1972), pp. 119–132.

[10] Alternately, the speaker may not be referring to any particular mode of presentation; he might mean only that Ralph's belief about Quine is under some conception which derives from a perception of Quine. It is for cases like this that I speak of reference to a type of mode of presentation.

[11] I take (iv) to be incompatible with the analysis of utterances like (6) given by David Kaplan in "Quantifying In," in *Words and Objections: Essays on the Work of W. V. Quine*, eds. D. Davidson and J. Hintikka, (Dordrecht, 1969), pp. 206–242.

[12] With Strawson, and for the reason he gives, I believe that one's knowledge of a material particular other than oneself is never under some description in general terms alone, but, ultimately, always under some description uniquely relating the thing to oneself. Even when I say "The richest man in the world probably doesn't do his own laundry" there is an implicit reference to myself and to the system of spatial and temporal relations to which I belong. See P. F. Strawson, *Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics* (London, 1959), Ch. 1.

[13] Brian Loar presents a picture similar to the one sketched here in "The Semantics of Singular Terms." I have benefited enormously from this paper, and from the eight million conversations I have had with Loar on these topics over the past several years.

[14] It of course remains Pickwickian even if one thinks that the knowing of (2) is not identical with the knowing of (4) because the descriptions are different.

[15] I do not pretend to be using "species" and "genus" as they are used in biology. There are problems here concerning the specification of the relevant natural kinds, but they are Kripke's problems, and in this paper I will not go into them.

[16] "Naming and Necessity," p. 319.

[17] Ultimately of course I would not care to represent the meaning of (i) as any sort of singular proposition; the formulation of (v) is rough in other ways that are immaterial to the point I am concerned to make.

[18] I am grateful to Brian Loar and Richard Warner for reading an earlier draft of this paper, and for suggesting several useful revisions.