Frege’s Other Puzzle: Relativity in Propositional Content
In C. Tillman (ed.), Routledge Handbook of Propositions (Routledge)
2020
Amie Thomasson’s Easy Approach to Ontology.
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 99: 244-50.
2019
Gricean Semantics and Vague Speaker-Meaning,
Croatian Journal of Philosophy 17 (2017): 293-319.
2017
Introduction to Part I: Philosophy of Language,
in K. Balog and S. Beardman (eds.), Consciousness and Meaning: Selected Essays of Brian Loar (OUP 2017): 3-13.
2017
Replies to the Essays.
In G. Ostertag (ed.), Meanings and Other Things: Themes from the Work of Stephen Schiffer (Oxford University Press, 2017): 385-527.
2016
Vague Properties.
In R. Dietz and S. Moruzzi, eds., Cuts and Clouds: Essays on the Nature and Logic of Vagueness. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
2010
Symposium on The Things We Mean
(précis of The Things We Mean together with replies to articles by Thomas Hofweber, John MacFarlane, and Crispin Wright). Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73: 208–43.
2006
Vagueness.
In M. Devitt and R. Hanley, eds., The Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Language. Malden, MA: Blackwell.
2006
Propositional Content.
In E. Lepore and B. Smith, eds., Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
2006
Facing Facts’ Consequences.
ProtoSociology: An International Journal of Interdisciplinary Research 23: 50–66.
2006
What Reference Has to Tell Us about Meaning.
In J. Branquinho, ed., Conteúde e Cognição: Actas do Seminário de Filosofia Analítica 2003–4. Lisbon: University of Lisbon Press.
2005
Paradox and the A Priori.
In T. Gendler and J. Hawthorne, eds., Oxford Studies in Epistemology I. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Reprinted in R. Dottori, ed., Reason and Reasonableness (Münster: Lit Verlag, 2005).
2005
Pleonastic Propositions.
In J. Beall and B. Armour-Garb, eds., Deflationary Theories of Truth. Chicago: Open Court.
2005
That-Clauses and the Semantics of Belief Reports.
Facta Philosophica 5: 163–82.
2003
Knowledge of Meaning.
In A. Barber, ed., Epistemology of Language. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
2003
The Things We Believe.
In C. Moulines and K. Niebergall, eds., Argument et Analyse. Paderborn: Mentis.
2002
The Ontological Status of Fictional Entities.
Yearbook for Philosophical Hermeneutics 1: 188–96.
2001
Communication.
In N. J. Smelser and P. B. Baltes, eds., The International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences. Oxford: Elsevier Science.
2001
“Meanings” and “Forward.”
In J. Campbell, M. O’Rourke & D. Shier, eds., Essays on Meaning & Truth. New York: Seven Bridges Press.
2001
Replies to Commentators on ‘Vagueness and Partial Belief’.
Philosophical Issues 10: 321–43.
2000
Pleonastic Fregeanism.
In A. Kanamori, ed., The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy, Vol. 6, Analytical Philosophy and Logic. Bowling Green: Philosophical Documentation Center.
2000
Pleonastic Fregeanism and Empty Names.
In A. Everett and T. Hofweber, eds., Empty Names, Fiction and the Puzzles of Non-Existence. Stanford: CSLI.
2000
Propositional Attitudes in Direct-Reference Semantics.
In K. M. Jaszczolt, ed., Pragmatics of Propositional Attitude Reports. Oxford: Elsevier Sciences. French translation published as “Les Attitudes Propositionnelles dans la Sémantique de la Référence Directe,” in R. Vallée (ed.), Langage et Çontexte: La Sémantique des Expressions Indexicales (Paris: Cahiers du Crea, 1999).
1999
Meanings and Concepts.
In K. Korta, E. Sosa, X. Arrazola, eds., Cognition, Agency and Rationality. Dordrecht: Springer. Slightly shortened version reprinted in Lingua e Stile 33 (1998): 399–411.
1999
Doubts about Implicit Conceptions.
Philosophical Issues 9: 89–9.
1998
Williamson on Our Ignorance in Borderline Cases.
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62: 937–43.
1997
The Hidden-Indexical Theory’s Logical-Form Problem: A Rejoinder.
Analysis 56: 92–7.
1996
Reply to Ray.
Noûs 29: 397–401.
1995
Reply to Yagisawa.
Philosophical Studies 76: 297–300.
1994
The Language-of-Thought Relations and Its Implications.
Philosophical Studies 76: 263-86 and Philosophical Issues 5: 155-75.
1994
Meanings and Their Nature.
From the Logical Point of View 2: 12–26.
1994
A Paradox of Meaning.
Noûs 28: 279–324.
1994
Thought and Language.
In S. Guttenplan, ed., A Companion to Philosophy of Mind. Oxford: Blackwell.
1994
Compositional Supervenience Theories and Compositional Meaning Theories.
Analysis 53: 24–9.
1993
Belief Ascription and a Paradox of Meaning.
Philosophical Issues 3: 89–121.
1993
Yes: A Reply to Brian Loar’s ‘Can We Confirm Supervenient Properties?’
Philosophical Issues 4: 93–100.
1993
Boghossian on Externalism and Inference.
In E. Villanueva, ed., Information, Semantics and Epistemology. Oxford: Blackwell.
1992
Does Mentalese Have a Compositional Semantics?
In B. Loewer and G. Rey, eds., Meaning in Mind: Essays on the Work of Jerry Fodor. Oxford: Blackwell.
1991
Physicalism.
Philosophical Perspectives 3: 153–85.
1990
Fodor’s Character.
In E. Villanueva, ed., Information, Semantics and Epistemology. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell.
1990
The Relational Theory of Belief: A Reply to Mark Richard.
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 71: 240–5.
1990
Précis of Remnants of Meaning and responses to articles on the book by Norbert Hornstein, Mark Johnston, and Barbara Partee.
Mind & Language 3: 53–63. (Special issue on Remnants of Meaning.)
1988
Introduction (with Susan Steele)
in S. Schiffer and S. Steele, eds., Cognition and Representation. Boulder: Westview.
1988
Extensionalist Semantics and Sententialist Theories of Belief.
In E. LePore, ed., New Directions in Semantics. London: Academic Press.
1987
Intentionality and the Language of Thought.
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 87: 35–55.
1986-7
Peacocke on Explanation in Psychology.
Mind & Language 1: 362–71.
1986
Stalnaker’s Problem of Intentionality.
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 67: 87–97.
1986
Functionalism and Belief.
In M. Brand and R. Harnish, eds., Problems in the Representation of Knowledge and Belief. Tucson: University of Arizona Press.
1986
Kripkenstein Meets the Remnants of Meaning.
Philosophical Studies 49: 147–62.
1986
The Real Trouble with Propositions.
In R. Bogdan, ed., Belief: Form, Content and Function. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Russian translation in V. Tselischev, ed., Logic, Cognitive and Computer Research (Novosibirsk: Novosibirsk University Press, 1991).
1986
Compositional Semantics and Language Understanding.
In R. Grandy and R. Warner, eds., Philosophical Grounds of Rationality: Intentions, Categories, Ends. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Reprinted in F. Récanati, ed., Communication et Cognition (Paris: CNRS, 1985).
1985
Meaning and Thought.
In A. Kasher and S. Lappin, eds., New Trends in Philosophy, Hebrew (translated by Dorit Bar-On) and English editions. Tel Aviv: Yachdav and Highland Park, NJ: Humanities Press.
1985
A Paradox of Desire.
American Philosophical Quarterly 13: 195–203.
1976
On Saying and Being.
Analysis 25 (1): 94–8.
1965
Reviews
Critical Notice of Charles Travis, Saying and Understanding: A Generative Theory of Illocutions.
Canadian Journal of Philosophy 7: 637–50. 1977
Gareth Evans, The Varieties of Reference
Journal of Philosophy 85: 33–42. 1988
Review Essay: How to Build a Person: A Prolegomenon by John Pollock.
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52: 713–24. 1992
Review Essay: Direct Reference: From Language to Thought, by Francois Recanati.
Linguistics and Philosophy 19: 91–102. 1996
Marian David, Correspondence and Disquotation: An Essay on the Nature of Truth.
International Studies in Philosophy 28: 112–13. 1996
Review of Jerry Fodor, Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong.
The Times Literary Supplement, June 26, 1998.
Horwich on Meaning: Critical Study of Paul Horwich’s Meaning.
Philosophical Quarterly 50: 527–36. 2000