Stephen Schiffer

Frege’s Other Puzzle: Relativity in Propositional Content

In C. Tillman (ed.), Routledge Handbook of Propositions (Routledge)

2020

Amie Thomasson’s Easy Approach to Ontology.

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 99: 244-50.

2019

Gricean Semantics and Vague Speaker-Meaning,

Croatian Journal of Philosophy 17 (2017): 293-319.

2017

Introduction to Part I: Philosophy of Language,

in K. Balog and S. Beardman (eds.), Consciousness and Meaning: Selected Essays of Brian Loar (OUP 2017): 3-13.

2017

Replies to the Essays.

In G. Ostertag (ed.), Meanings and Other Things: Themes from the Work of Stephen Schiffer (Oxford University Press, 2017): 385-527.

2016

Vague Properties.

In R. Dietz and S. Moruzzi, eds., Cuts and Clouds: Essays on the Nature and Logic of Vagueness. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

2010

Symposium on The Things We Mean

(précis of The Things We Mean together with replies to articles by Thomas Hofweber, John MacFarlane, and Crispin Wright). Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73: 208–43.

2006

Vagueness.

In M. Devitt and R. Hanley, eds., The Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Language. Malden, MA: Blackwell.

2006

Propositional Content.

In E. Lepore and B. Smith, eds., Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

2006

Facing Facts’ Consequences.

ProtoSociology: An International Journal of Interdisciplinary Research 23: 50–66.

2006

What Reference Has to Tell Us about Meaning.

In J. Branquinho, ed., Conteúde e Cognição: Actas do Seminário de Filosofia Analítica 2003–4. Lisbon: University of Lisbon Press.

2005

Paradox and the A Priori.

In T. Gendler and J. Hawthorne, eds., Oxford Studies in Epistemology I. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Reprinted in R. Dottori, ed., Reason and Reasonableness (Münster: Lit Verlag, 2005).

2005

Pleonastic Propositions.

In J. Beall and B. Armour-Garb, eds., Deflationary Theories of Truth. Chicago: Open Court.

2005

That-Clauses and the Semantics of Belief Reports.

Facta Philosophica 5: 163–82.

2003

Knowledge of Meaning.

In A. Barber, ed., Epistemology of Language. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

2003

The Things We Believe.

In C. Moulines and K. Niebergall, eds., Argument et Analyse. Paderborn: Mentis.

2002

The Ontological Status of Fictional Entities.

Yearbook for Philosophical Hermeneutics 1: 188–96.

2001

Communication.

In N. J. Smelser and P. B. Baltes, eds., The International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences. Oxford: Elsevier Science.

2001

“Meanings” and “Forward.”

In J. Campbell, M. O’Rourke & D. Shier, eds., Essays on Meaning & Truth. New York: Seven Bridges Press.

2001

Replies to Commentators on ‘Vagueness and Partial Belief’.

Philosophical Issues 10: 321–43.

2000

Pleonastic Fregeanism.

In A. Kanamori, ed., The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy, Vol. 6, Analytical Philosophy and Logic. Bowling Green: Philosophical Documentation Center.

2000

Pleonastic Fregeanism and Empty Names.

In A. Everett and T. Hofweber, eds., Empty Names, Fiction and the Puzzles of Non-Existence. Stanford: CSLI.

2000

Propositional Attitudes in Direct-Reference Semantics.

In K. M. Jaszczolt, ed., Pragmatics of Propositional Attitude Reports. Oxford: Elsevier Sciences. French translation published as “Les Attitudes Propositionnelles dans la Sémantique de la Référence Directe,” in R. Vallée (ed.), Langage et Çontexte: La Sémantique des Expressions Indexicales (Paris: Cahiers du Crea, 1999).

1999

Meanings and Concepts.

In K. Korta, E. Sosa, X. Arrazola, eds., Cognition, Agency and Rationality. Dordrecht: Springer. Slightly shortened version reprinted in Lingua e Stile 33 (1998): 399–411.

1999

Doubts about Implicit Conceptions.

Philosophical Issues 9: 89–9.

1998

Williamson on Our Ignorance in Borderline Cases.

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62: 937–43.

1997

The Hidden-Indexical Theory’s Logical-Form Problem: A Rejoinder.

Analysis 56: 92–7.

1996

Reply to Ray.

Noûs 29: 397–401.

1995

Reply to Yagisawa.

Philosophical Studies 76: 297–300.

1994

The Language-of-Thought Relations and Its Implications.

Philosophical Studies 76: 263-86 and Philosophical Issues 5: 155-75.

1994

Meanings and Their Nature.

From the Logical Point of View 2: 12–26.

1994

A Paradox of Meaning.

Noûs 28: 279–324.

1994

Thought and Language.

In S. Guttenplan, ed., A Companion to Philosophy of Mind. Oxford: Blackwell.

1994

Compositional Supervenience Theories and Compositional Meaning Theories.

Analysis 53: 24–9.

1993

Belief Ascription and a Paradox of Meaning.

Philosophical Issues 3: 89–121.

1993

Yes: A Reply to Brian Loar’s ‘Can We Confirm Supervenient Properties?’

Philosophical Issues 4: 93–100.

1993

Boghossian on Externalism and Inference.

In E. Villanueva, ed., Information, Semantics and Epistemology. Oxford: Blackwell.

1992

Does Mentalese Have a Compositional Semantics?

In B. Loewer and G. Rey, eds., Meaning in Mind: Essays on the Work of Jerry Fodor. Oxford: Blackwell.

1991

Physicalism.

Philosophical Perspectives 3: 153–85.

1990

Fodor’s Character.

In E. Villanueva, ed., Information, Semantics and Epistemology. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell.

1990

The Relational Theory of Belief: A Reply to Mark Richard.

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 71: 240–5.

1990

Précis of Remnants of Meaning and responses to articles on the book by Norbert Hornstein, Mark Johnston, and Barbara Partee.

Mind & Language 3: 53–63. (Special issue on Remnants of Meaning.)

1988

Introduction (with Susan Steele)

in S. Schiffer and S. Steele, eds., Cognition and Representation. Boulder: Westview.

1988

Extensionalist Semantics and Sententialist Theories of Belief.

In E. LePore, ed., New Directions in Semantics. London: Academic Press.

1987

Intentionality and the Language of Thought.

Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 87: 35–55.

1986-7

Peacocke on Explanation in Psychology.

Mind & Language 1: 362–71.

1986

Stalnaker’s Problem of Intentionality.

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 67: 87–97.

1986

Functionalism and Belief.

In M. Brand and R. Harnish, eds., Problems in the Representation of Knowledge and Belief. Tucson: University of Arizona Press.

1986

Kripkenstein Meets the Remnants of Meaning.

Philosophical Studies 49: 147–62.

1986

The Real Trouble with Propositions.

In R. Bogdan, ed., Belief: Form, Content and Function. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Russian translation in V. Tselischev, ed., Logic, Cognitive and Computer Research (Novosibirsk: Novosibirsk University Press, 1991).

1986

Compositional Semantics and Language Understanding.

In R. Grandy and R. Warner, eds., Philosophical Grounds of Rationality: Intentions, Categories, Ends. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Reprinted in F. Récanati, ed., Communication et Cognition (Paris: CNRS, 1985).

1985

Meaning and Thought.

In A. Kasher and S. Lappin, eds., New Trends in Philosophy, Hebrew (translated by Dorit Bar-On) and English editions. Tel Aviv: Yachdav and Highland Park, NJ: Humanities Press.

1985

A Paradox of Desire.

American Philosophical Quarterly 13: 195–203.

1976

On Saying and Being.

Analysis 25 (1): 94–8.

1965

Reviews

Critical Notice of Charles Travis, Saying and Understanding: A Generative Theory of Illocutions.

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 7: 637–50. 1977

Gareth Evans, The Varieties of Reference

Journal of Philosophy 85: 33–42. 1988

Review Essay: How to Build a Person: A Prolegomenon by John Pollock.

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52: 713–24. 1992

Review Essay: Direct Reference: From Language to Thought, by Francois Recanati.

Linguistics and Philosophy 19: 91–102. 1996

Marian David, Correspondence and Disquotation: An Essay on the Nature of Truth.

International Studies in Philosophy 28: 112–13. 1996

Review of Jerry Fodor, Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong.

The Times Literary Supplement, June 26, 1998.

Horwich on Meaning: Critical Study of Paul Horwich’s Meaning.

Philosophical Quarterly 50: 527–36. 2000